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Glossary of Terms
The Association of Small Island States (AOSIS)--an intergovernmental organization of low-lying
and small island countries created in 1990
Small Island Developing States (SIDS)--UN working group composed of small island states
from the Pacific, Caribbean, and African regions
Pacific Small Island States (PSIDS)--UN working group comprised of Small Island states in the
Pacific. Exists as a subgroup within the SIDS group. Does not include Australia or New
Zealand
Pacific Island Forum (PIF)--First working group made up of Pacific Island States established in
1971. Originally led by Australia and New Zealand
Pacific Territory Trust/ Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands--The 1947 UN Trusteeship that
granted sovereign control of the Marshall Islands to the United States
United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)--International
environmental treaty started in 1992 within the United Nations.
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Introduction

So what are the legends
we tell ourselves today?
What songs are we throwing into the fire . . . what
are we burning?
And will future generations
recite these stories by heart, hand
over chest?
Maybe
In one legend
It’ll start by saying
in the beginning
was water

-an excerpt of Utilomar by Kathy Jetñil-Kiljner

In 2014, Kiribati president Anote Tong purchased 20 square km on Vanua Levu, a Fijian
island. Tong declared this land as the first settlement allotted for resettling i-Kiribati citizens who
have had their island homes swallowed by the rising Pacific Sea. This bold move by President
Tong sent a clear message to a world gridlocked by climate stalemates: “The purpose of buying
that land is to send a very strong message to the international community which had not been
responding to our calls for something to be done.”1 Jarring and brash, the actions of the former
president of Kiribati highlight a massive hole in international law--the lack of legal protection
and recognition of those displaced by environmental forces. Though new social understandings

1

N.a. “Interview with kiribati president anote tong”. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeMl7_Legrw.
2016
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of the human effects of global climate change have become more understood and accepted in the
past few years, there still have been no official changes to decades-old conventions regarding
international asylum and refugee status. The current international refugee system fails to provide
for those fleeing drastic environmental forces, which raises many questions regarding the
survival of some of the world’s most vulnerable individuals.
This lack of legal protections for environmental displacement has serious real world
implications. Many individuals attempting to flee life-threatening conditions have only been met
with legal red tape. In 2012, Ioane Teitiota, a Kiribati native, applied for asylum in New Zealand
on the grounds that he was unable to grow food or find potable water in Kiribati. Teiota’s island
home of Tarawa--the capital of Kiribati--sits only 9 feet above ground at its tallest point; Teiota’s
personal home is separated from the ocean by a crumbling concrete sea wall. Teitiota applied for
refugee status on the claim that climate change and coastal erosion posed an imminent and lethal
threat to him and his family. In an online interview, Teitoita attests, “I am the same as those who
are fleeing from war. I too am afraid of dying.”2 Though he applied for asylum in New Zealand-the country where his children were born--he was denied refugee status and was subsequently
deported. The New Zealand government claimed that because Teitiota’s case did not involve his
political persecution based on the criteria outlined in the UNHCR definition (race, nationality,
religion etc.), he could not claim international protection through refugee status. He has since
appealed his case to international tribunals four times, only to be continuously denied asylum.
Many researchers understand Teitota’s case as the first would-be climate refugee; since his
landmark 2015 case, there have been 11 other Pacific islanders who have similarly applied for
asylum, only to be denied as well.

2

McDonald, Tim. “The man who would be the first climate change refugee.” BBC News. 5 November 2015.
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Though the term exists informally in lay-speech regarding climate-induced migration,
there legally is no such thing as a ‘climate refugee.’3 By the UNHCR definition, a refugee is
someone who is fleeing persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, adherence to a
particular social group, or political opinion.4 The concept of “refugee” emerged to protect
individuals fleeing political persecution, and the UNHCR did not set up any parameters for
social, economic, or environmental reasons for fleeing a country.5 Yet, despite international
failure to provide an adequate framework for climate displaced peoples, these island advocates
are not standing idle. To Pacific islanders, climate negotiations are not merely a matter of lip
service and diplomatic parading, but rather the key to survival in multiple senses. The case of the
Pacific islands is particularly grave due to their vulnerable and isolated geography. Peeking just a
few meters above sea level, the topography of these islands has a substantial role in shaping their
environmental interactions. Many of these nations lie atop semi-submerged atolls--small
fragments of geographically “decaying” islands that usually feature an outer barrier reef and
central lagoon.6 The lives and cultures of Pacific islanders have centered around subsistence
farming atop narrow strips of land and fishing in central lagoons and barrier reefs. Global sea
level rise and coastal inundation specifically target island ways of life. While most modeling of
global sea level rise depicts a uniform, constant rise due to melting glaciers and thermal
expansion of water, global sea level rise is happening at varied rates. Changing ocean currents
and topography make it so that South Pacific islands will feel the effects of global sea rise at a

McAdams, Jane,,“Swimming against the tide.” University of New South Wales, 26 November 2010
N.a,“United nations framework convention on climate change,” United Nations, 9 May 1992
5
N.a,“United nations framework convention on climate change,” United Nations, 9 May 1992.
6
N. a, NOAA Ocean Service Education, “The life of a coral atoll,” 24 November 2019.
3
4
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more accelerated rate than other coastal areas worldwide.7 The effects of this sea level rise is
projected to make these nations largely uninhabitable by the mid-21st Century.8
The effects of climate change are not confined to the complete submersion of these lowlying atolls themselves. The multi-dimensional factors of climate change such as coastal
inundation, ground-water contamination, and increased natural storm activity coincide to
progressively render these nations inhospitable. Lack of access to clean drinking water has
become a major problem for many villages in Kiribati and Tuvalu especially. Health issues are of
main concern, as inadequate access to water has opened a Pandora’s box of sanitation-related
conditions and diseases. Outbreaks of dengue fever, siguatera poisoning, and measles have
become increasingly common in the islands.9 Children have reportedly developed skin rashes
from groundwater contaminated by pollution and storm drainage. Currently, Kiribati has a higher
child mortality rate than Bangladesh due in part to this lack of access to clean water.10
Along with this gradual degradation of these islands and its resources, increased storm
activity has also caused major flooding and infrastructural damage in these nations. In 2015,
Cyclone Pam brought severe weather to the Pacific islands. Hospitals flooded and winds swept
sand and debris into patients’ rooms, causing a complete evacuation to a nearby school.11 One
entire coastal village permanently sank in the storm, taking all but the steeple of a white wooden
church beneath the waves. Cyclone Pam itself destroyed 96% of the food crops on Vanuatu and
caused over $500 billion in damage.12 In Tuvalu, an entire island became temporarily submerged
by sea swells which forced its population to seek refuge on neighboring islands. The effects of

N.a, NOAA Ocean Service Education. “The life of a coral atoll.” Accessed online on November 24 2019.
Fletcher, Chip. “As sea levels rise, tropical pacific islands face a perfect storm.” Yale Environment Press. 2018.
9
Ives, Mike, “A remote pacific nation, threatened by rising seas.” New York Times. 2016.
10
Ives, Mike, “A remote pacific nation, threatened by rising seas.” New York Times. 2016.
11
Ives, Mike, “A remote pacific nation, threatened by rising seas.” New York Times. 2016.
12
Ives, Mike, “A remote pacific nation, threatened by rising seas.” New York Times. 2016.
7
8
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climate change are not happening in some far-off future; islands are already starting to become
inhabitable due to environmental degradation. As scientists project that storm activity will
increase in severity and frequency, we must analyze how environmental will affect the sociopolitical survival of entire Pacific populations.
There is a significant danger that 22 island nations in the Pacific could be lost to the
rising tide within the next century, and this prospect of entire landmasses disappearing raises
unprecedented political questions. What happens to island nations that disappear? Are they still
states? Are its people still citizens? Categorically, territory that lies beneath the ocean at high
tide cannot be considered part of a ‘defined territory’--if more land is lost to rising oceans, the
Wesphalean definition of a sovereign nation would cease to apply to these islands. Likewise,
governments rely on the existence of a defined territory and a permanent population over which
to govern.13 Typically, governments only lose land to illegitimate occupiers or seizures from
other groups or states--can we then potentially view the rising ocean as a colonial or imperial
presence? What about the responsibility of developed governments and industries whose massive
carbon consumption have created conditions for sea level rise?
As the prospect of full climate adaptation strategies seem increasingly slim, the
possibility of island-wide migration plans looms overhead. In an increasingly globalized world,
we assume that these people would move to growing diasporas in distant, developed countries.
Yet, there are no international legal mechanisms put in place to assist with the movement of
people fleeing environmental degradation and destruction.14 The UN definition of a refugee

13

Wannier, Gregory E., and Michael B. Gerrard,"Disappearing states: harnessing international law to preserve
cultures and society." Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance: Volume I: Legal Responses and
Global Responsibility, 2013.
14 Wannier, Gregory E., and Michael B. Gerrard,"Disappearing states: harnessing international law to preserve
cultures and society." Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance: Volume I: Legal Responses and
Global Responsibility, 2013.
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excludes those fleeing economic or environmental causes and solely relied upon its dated, ColdWar driven political interpretations of asylum. The inability of international law to accommodate
for victims of environmental degradation creates an uncertainty in the legal and political fate of
these island nations.
In this thesis, I will first analyze the consequences of the international human rights and
refugee regime and examine its deliberate failure to provide adequate humanitarian relief to
victims of climate change. By placing the contemporary issues of climate displacement into the
historic context of the origins of the international refugee system, I will demonstrate how
imperial legacies and power politics continue to deny ‘climate refugees’ agency in their quest for
recognition and asylum. With this framework in mind, I will then explore how post-colonial,
Pacific Small-Island Developing States have been so successful in advocating for climate justice
reforms in a hegemonic world order that inherently prioritizes the interests of Western
superpowers. Ultimately, this success has been brought about by an artistic and skillful
harnessing of powerful media “spectacles” and frameworks that caught the attention of
international audiences. The emotional performance of these spectacular narratives ruptured the
stiff and stoic norms of UN debate and ultimately demanded change in an institution known for
its apathy and inefficiency.
Through an examination of the origin of the UN refugee system as well as an analysis of
the progress made within Committee of Party (COP) meetings, we can understand that Small
Island Developing States have taken a significant role in shaping climate diplomacy. As an
extension, we can use the Pacific islands as a case study of a broader analysis of the nexus
between anti-colonialism and the rise of alternative climate change advocacy. As islanders rely
on the structures and dynamics laid within the UN to advocate for their political and physical
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survival, we must pay attention to the intersection between institutional and grassroots push
towards adaptive climate change measures. These international coalitions serve as a final push
for survival as waves lap upon shrinking shores and carry with them the culture, history, and
identity of a people lost.

Institutional Status Quo in UN and the Cause of Its Origins
Climate diplomacy as a discipline emerged in the early 1990s. Talks of greenhouse gas
emissions and sustainable development initiatives spearheaded these conversations; however as
climate change continues to become understood more as a nuanced and intricate issue, its
international discourses and policy responses have likewise begun to evolve. One recent
development in international climate discourses is the conceptualization of climate-induced
migration. As the international community continues to see developing migratory flows of
people displaced by climate change, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there is a
fundamental lack of legal mechanisms for migrants fleeing environmental degradation. This
ominous vacuum of legal parameters is amplified in the case of the Pacific islands; as rising sea
levels threaten the physical existence of these “underdeveloped” states, policy-makers are forced
to grapple with a series of existential questions regarding state sovereignty and migration as a
humanitarian issue.
While the discipline of climate-induced migration is still emerging, migration based on
environmental factors has existed throughout human civilization. People have historically
migrated due to floods, droughts, and other environmental factors for millennia.15 The concept of
climate-induced migration is not new; climate migrants have only become a logistical “problem”

Carter, George. “Establishing a pacific voice in the climate change negotiations.” The New Pacific Diplomacy,
ANU Press, 2015, pp. 205–220.
15
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in the contemporary period due to the institutionalization of solidified state borders following the
official end of colonialism and WWII. Along with this formalized system of state borders came
the subsequent adoption of stringent international migration and asylum laws.16 The
institutionalized definition of asylum within the Refugee Convention of 1951 prioritized
individuals fleeing political persecution from tyrannical governments. The adoption of such legal
frameworks excludes the humanitarian protection of those fleeing from environmental causes,
even though there have been ample cases displaying the need for a more encompassing migration
policy. New scholarship on climate-based migration also highlights this legal gap and displays a
fundamental need for institutional legal reform.
Though limited, much of the emerging literature on the study of climate-induced
migration has focused on the massive movements of people fleeing environmental degradation in
Sub-Saharan Africa.17 Furthermore, increased international attention on the larger issue of
refugees following the 2015 European Refugee “Crisis” has led scholars and diplomats to also
engage with the concept of “environmental migrant” as an informal category of displaced
person.18 This recognition of environmental migrants served as an informal attempt to recognize
these individuals--primarily within domestic law--and bring attention to internal flows of people,
especially those who move to urban areas.
While this literature can supplement our understanding of the political ramifications of
Pacific movements, it cannot fully prescribe any sort of policy model for the Pacific islands. The
cases of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific islands differ in one key respect: while much of the

16

In my thesis, I examine theory and literature behind understanding the UN human rights regime as a neocolonial
extension of empire. I also engage with theory regarding the creation of institutionalized state borders, however for
the scope of this paper, I have chosen to omit this research simply due to time constraints at the moment.
17
White, Gregory. “Climate change and migration: security and borders in a warming world.” Oxford University
Press. 2011.
18
White, Gregory. “Climate change and migration: security and borders in a warming world.” Oxford University
Press. 2011.
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discussion surrounding Sub-Saharan Africa centers around the eventual return of migrants to
their home countries, the potential physical erasure of Pacific islands negates any possibility of
refoulement. Once climate change takes full force in the islands, there can be no possibility for
return. The permanence of the Pacific island case study poses a particularly ominous threat to the
current international refugee law, which regards asylum as both political and temporary.19 In
order to create a more equitable humanitarian system of international climate-based migration,
there must be a significant alteration of our existing migration mindset.
In response to the current lack of legal protection for migrants and asylum-seekers, many
climate advocates view amending established refugee law as a valid and productive means to
deal with climate change.20 A variety of actors have called for a new international treaty on
climate change displacement, or a Protocol to the Refugee Convention or the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),21 to create a new class of refugee-like
protected persons. In 2006, the Maldives proposed amending the 1951 Refugee Convention to
extend the definition of a ‘refugee’ in article 1A(2) to include ‘climate refugees.’ Again in
December 2009, advocates from the Maldives argued during discussions leading up to the
Copenhagen Climate Convention that the convention on refugees could be revised to protect
people facing environmental issues. While these particular pushes for recognition have come
from nation states like the Maldives, non-state actors have also begun to advocate for a change to
this convention. In the same year, a certain environmental justice organization petitioned the
UNFCCC “to ensure social, cultural and economic rehabilitation of ‘climate refugees’ through
recognizing them as ‘Universal Natural Persons.’”22

N.a, “Convention on the status of the refugee.” United Nations. 1951.
N.a, “Convention on the status of the refugee.” United Nations. 1951.
21 N.a, “Convention on the status of the refugee.” United Nations. 1951.
22 N.a, “Convention on the status of the refugee.” United Nations. 1951.
19

20
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However, while there is ample support for the adoption of a new, encompassing refugee
convention, there is also valid hesitation from some island advocates. Many of these advocates
are fearful that using an official refugee label to describe their situation connotes victimhood,
passivity, and a lack of agency. In Tuvalu and Kiribati refugees are viewed as people waiting
helplessly in camps, relying on handouts, with no prospects for the future. To be a refugee, in
their eyes, is to lack dignity.23 This outlook, though rather bleak and mistrusting, relies on the
power of existing prolific rhetoric and discourses surrounding international climate change
policy.24 Though many Pacific advocates argue that migration--as the final means of survival for
these island peoples--amplifies the interests and voices of small island states, others argue that it
inhibits the creation of more transformative multilateral climate change mitigation coalitions. In
their eyes, our own international focus on migration and displacement limits our understanding
of island agency and guides our perception of the role of Pacific delegations.25 This fear of
victimhood relates directly with the hegemonic understanding of climate refugees as something
that affects Global North countries, rather than a distinction that provides necessary humanitarian
assistance to dignified individuals. It also shifts the focus away from potential avenues of climate
change adaptation--a key component of wider climate justice demands.
While there currently exists a wide gap in international protective mechanisms for
climate refugees, new discursive change in the UNFCCC Committee of Parties raises questions
as to the status of climate-based movements. In the 2015 Paris Accord negotiations, nation-states
recognized the existence of climate-induced migrants and displaced peoples. In the same breath,

Shigematsu, Setsu and. Camacho, Keith, “Militarized currents: toward a decolonized future in asia and the
pacific,” University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
24
Kelman, I. “Hearing local voices from small island developing states for climate change,” Local
Environment, 15, 605–619, 2010.
25
Dolla, Simran, “International legal protection for climate refugees,” Journal of Sustainable Laws and Policy.
October 2010.
23
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the Accords put forth a movement towards the adoption of a “Climate Change Displacement
Facility” in the near future. The Accords then go on to identify the case of the “Small Pacific
Island States” as especially vulnerable to international movements and migration. Though these
particular examples exist only in a rhetorical sense, there is something to be said on the power of
this recognition in international climate diplomacy. This recognition raises a few particular
questions, such as who put these particular phrases in the Accords and most importantly, how?
Stunts like the President of Kiribati’s purchase of Fijian land call attention to the
fatalistic plight of the Pacific islands. Though the literature on the subject is by all means still
“emerging,” a global understanding of the plight of environmentally-displaced people has
increased in the past few years. As a direct result of these media spectacles, Pacific islanders
have become the political poster-child for climate refugees worldwide. As stark images of semisubmerged palm trees and canoe-ridden asylum seekers occupy the minds of an increasingly
climate-conscious public, we must examine the process of how we got to discussing these cases
altogether.

Western Interpretations: Climate Refugees as Security Threats
The international migration and asylum process has been entirely shaped by Global North
countries. Because of the heavy autonomy and control these nations have over refugee
processing, much of the discourse on the asylum process itself has been focused on how
migration affects receiving nations. In the Global North, portrayals of migrants as nuisances have
come to the forefront of international discussions and shape the way that these nations interact
with refugees--especially informal ones. Receiving nations dictate the status of asylum seekers
globally and ultimately determine the placement of displaced peoples. As the self-appointed
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puppet-masters of humanitarian movement, these nations can decide how many refugees they are
willing to accept, as well as the sex, nationality, and religion of incoming asylum seekers.
Inherently, the status of these refugees is contingent upon global recognition of the conflict in
which they flee; if disasters do not gain the undivided attention of receiving countries, these
nations will have no political incentive to house them.
As a result of this political definition of asylum, many have critiqued the United Nations
refugee program as an inherently biased system that prioritizes state-centric policies over
humanitarian need. This is important to understand when we examine the legal gap regarding
individuals fleeing climate change. While the concept of environmental displacement has been
known for quite some time, the political reluctance of Western states to adopt “climate refugees”
into their humanitarian agenda is evident of this biased power dynamic in the UN. The inability
of nation states to provide for environmental migrants is inherently rooted in Western
interpretation of climate refugees as helpless, dependent individuals. By looking into the
discourses surrounding climate-induced migration, we can begin to understand what the adoption
of a justice-oriented “climate refugee” definition would counter.
In contemporary discussions on climate change migration, Pacific islanders have been
portrayed as the victims. In a vast rising sea, helplessly stationary upon shrinking atolls, these
individuals have no choice but to appeal to the benevolence of developed world leaders who hold
their future in their policy-writing-pens. Migration is seen not only as inevitable, but most
importantly as one-sided; climate-induced migration is something that affects the leaders of the
Global North, and is something that they alone can solve. As the UNFCCC outlines, member
countries “recognize the need for developed countries to take immediate action in a flexible
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manner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards comprehensive response strategies
at the global level... to deal with the culminating greenhouse effect.”26
Current climate change discourse has been focused on how the West will adapt to biblical
floods of migrants.27 As border crossings increase and receiving states begin to feel the effects of
increased migration, developed countries have co-opted the discourse on climate-induced
migration to supplement a more Western-oriented framework. As a result, the migratory
response to climate change has often been cast as a securitized issue that primarily concerns
receiving states. Refugees and migrants are inherent security risks to developed nations, and
receiving countries should take considerable caution when deciding if and how they are to
incorporate migrants. This approach prioritizes the security of Global North countries over the
survival of small island states and as a result shifts global attention away from the humanitarian
aspect of climate change. Besides denying climate refugees access to humanitarian support,
“these frames also undermine the desire of Small Island Developing State communities to be
seen as proactive, self-determining, and active agents of change.”28

Rise of SDIS in the UN and the Proliferation of Advocacy Groups
Pacific small island states have made considerable headway in their fight for a more
righteous climate platform. Through coalitions between institutional working groups in the UN
and local media organizations, small island nations in the Pacific have made international
discursive change regarding climate-based migration, and have effectively displayed their

Simonelli, Andrea C, “Governing climate induced migration and displacement IGO expansion and global policy
implications,” International Political Economy Series, 2016.
27
Simonelli, Andrea C, “Governing climate induced migration and displacement IGO expansion and global policy
implications,” International Political Economy Series, 2016.
28
Dreher, A. and Voyeur, K, “Self-determination in the Pacific,” University of Hawaii Press, 2014.
26
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agency as change-making actors. By noting the disproportionate involvement of these small
states and their collective effect on the outcome of these conventions, we can understand how the
international adoption of the phrase “climate refugees” signifies a growing strength of small
island states. Through unconventional means--namely the coalition between proactive media
outlets and institutional diplomatic strategies--small Pacific island states have effectively turned
heads to notice the plight of their “sinking” homes. We can document the discursive success of
island activists through an examination of how island-built coalitions advanced their agenda over
the years within the UNFCCC--an institution the Pacific islanders themselves moved to create.
Due to the particularly vulnerable positioning of their island homes, Pacific activists have
an important role in advocating for climate justice reform within the United Nations. Through
the creation of different working groups within the UN (such as the AOSIS, SIDS, and Pacific
Island Forum groups), Pacific island nations have created a significant regional coalition focused
on climate justice reforms and reparations. The mentality behind this coalition formation is that
while these nations individually have little power in terms of negotiation, together they can call
attention to regional issues. Coalition building among states--especially among small developing
states with shared colonial history--has been a rather effective mobilizing tool in international
spheres.29
As relatively young states, many of these nations only gained independence from colonial
powers following World War II and the subsequent dismantling of wartime empires in the
Pacific. However, despite apparent efforts to liberate colonized nations worldwide, many of the
small island nations in the Pacific were also subject to lasting infringements of sovereignty.
Notably, the Pacific Territory Trust was a UN ruling that allowed the United States to legally and

29

N.a, "The Pacific", UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 26 January 2014.
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politically control the Marshall Islands and other Micronesian communities through the
framework of the UN. While on paper, many Pacific nations were categorically “independent,”
the specter of imperial legacy persisted through the region and inhibited local autonomous
growth. As a result, Pacific island nations looked to regional multilateralism as a means to
nurture their independent development and political agendas. The basis of all Pacific diplomacy
was borne out of the postcolonial strife for more autonomous and independent agency-building
by Pacific island nations.30

A New, Pacific Diplomacy
The birth of a new “Pacific Diplomacy” was conceptualized around the desire to forge a
postcolonial diplomatic system in Oceania.31 Pacific diplomacy refers to the diplomatic
endeavors pursued by Pacific states in global forums or international arenas which recognize and
interact with the Pacific bloc.32 In order to bring about this new wave of diplomacy, Pacific
leaders forged an imagined community in the region through strategic coalition building.33
Founded in 1971, The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) was the first major institutionalized display of
Pacific multilateralism which demanded attention on behalf of its small island member states.
The Pacific Island Forum functioned as a forum for island nations to coalesce and advocate for
certain interests within the UN. In the 1980s, PIF member states brought the French government

Tarte, Sandra, and Fry, Greg, "The ‘new pacific diplomacy’: an introduction," In Understanding Oceania:
Celebrating the University of the South Pacific and Its Collaboration with The Australian National University, 36180. 2019.
31
Tarte, Sandra, and Fry, Greg, "The ‘new pacific diplomacy’: an introduction," In Understanding Oceania:
Celebrating the University of the South Pacific and Its Collaboration with The Australian National University, 36180. 2019.
32Tarte, Sandra, and Fry, Greg, "The ‘new pacific diplomacy’: an introduction," In Understanding Oceania:
Celebrating the University of the South Pacific and Its Collaboration with The Australian National University, 36180. 2019.
33 Anderson, Benedict, “Imagined communities,” The Nation. 1986.
30
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to public scrutiny in the UN Decolonization Committee over their maintained possession of New
Caledonia. One common occurrence in Pacific agendas is an undying commitment to regional
interests and island solidarity.34
While the PIF was primarily intended to voice the concerns of marginalized small island
states, the incorporation of regional powerhouses Australia and New Zealand effectively
overpowered the forum and marginalized the interests and voices of many smaller PIF
countries.35 While the issue of climate change is inherently personal and critical to Pacific island
nations, many attempts to shape climate change agreements within the PIF have clashed with the
economic interests of developed industrial nations like Australia and New Zealand. Australia has
been one of the most reluctant nations to adopt greenhouse gas emission initiatives globally, and
has been internationally reprimanded for its draconian asylum and migration laws.36 While most
PIF countries share common goals regarding climate change policy, New Zealand and Australia
do not necessarily share these values. Many Pacific diplomats liken the position of New Zealand
and Australia in the PIF to being in a support group with some of your staunchest adversaries-utterly unproductive and downright discouraging.
In addition to their excessive mic-hogging, New Zealand and Australia have also used the
PIF to advance aggressive diplomatic agendas against its fellow committee members. In 2009,
Australia spearheaded the move to suspend Fiji from PIF negotiations due to Fiji’s refusal to
hold democratic elections.37 Fiji has long been regarded as Australia’s “problem-child” in the
region, given their willingness to call out the Australian government on their repeated instances
Tarte, Sandra, and Fry, Greg, "The ‘new pacific diplomacy’: an introduction," In Understanding Oceania:
Celebrating the University of the South Pacific and Its Collaboration with The Australian National University, 36180. 2019.
35
Manoa, Fulori, “The new pacific diplomacy at the United Nations: The Rise of the PSIDS,” The New Pacific
Diplomacy, 2015.
36 McAdams, Jan,. “Why refugees are legal and australia’s policies are not.” ANU Press. 2014.
37N.a, “Dr Sikua on Fiji's suspension from PIF.” Solomon Times. 6 May 2009.
34
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of climate inaction.38 Many looked at this expulsion as an abuse of Australia’s massive power in
the PIF and a political co-option of the group’s objectives. Rendered bitter by this move, Fiji
vowed on multiple occasions that they would never return to the forum so long as Australia and
New Zealand occupied their negotiation seats (Fiji did, however, return to the PIF in 2014
despite the continued participation of their Western adversaries).39 After this attack, many small
island nations came to Fiji’s defense and advocated for the reincorporation of the state into the
forum. This move is testament to the ideological sense of community and connection that the
Pacific islands have forged among themselves.
Island solidarity in the Pacific has manifested itself into this “ride or die” mentality that
focused its efforts on fostering group inclusion and dynamics. Because of the existing power
imbalance in their own club and in order to secure Fiji’s inclusion, the Pacific island states
moved to kick out their Western neighbors. Thus in 1979, the Pacific Small Island States
(PSIDS) group--which excluded Australia and New Zealand--was created to function as a new
outlet for small island states to discuss their strategic interests. These UN groupings are where
most of the UN Pacific voting gets done--the small nature of the Pacific delegations make it
more productive to shape regional voting strategies and interests.
Another move to shape regional interests and cohesion came about during the Malé
Declaration on Global Warming and Sea Level Rise in 1989. This convention took place in the
Maldives--a small island nation located in the Indian Ocean. In Malé, 30 island nations formed
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): an action group whose lobbying power brought
about the United Nations Framework for the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).40 The
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UNFCCC is the main diplomatic body for drafting climate conventions and updates to
international agreements. This is the UN framework which adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997
and the Paris Climate Accords in 2015, both of which continue to be the most substantial
international climate accords ever conceived.41
AOSIS also played a major role in shaping climate change doctrine by drafting the first
text of the Kyoto Protocol, which was the first binding climate change agreement that held
countries liable for their global carbon emissions. The Kyoto Protocol is still regarded as one of
the most influential climate change documents and paved the way for the Paris Accords of 2015.
During Paris, AOSIS helped the UN integrate the Migration, Environment and Climate Change
Division into its International Organization of Migration (IOM) offices with the intent to
“address the migration, environment and climate nexus.”42 Furthermore, following the Kyoto
Protocol, AOSIS asked the Human Rights Council to take up the question of climate change,
arguing that climate change violence and adaptation need to be understood in terms of their
ramification on international human rights. Subsequently, eighty-eight UN member states
endorsed the council’s recommendation that human rights expert bodies become involved in the
United Nations climate change negotiations.43
Through their advocacy, small island nations have strategically and artistically attracted
international attention to their plight. When it comes to climate advocacy in the United Nations,
small island states like Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu have made considerable “noise” in these
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forums. As William Sweet notes, “Like dying patients who get a lot of attention even though
there may be nothing that anybody can do to save them, AOSIS nations are listened to when they
speak up at international negotiations.”44 This attention has manifested itself in the adoption of
certain foci in international negotiations within UNFCCC, and lead to discursive change within
the UN Framework. AOSIS has exerted a largely positive influence on climate change
negotiations, despite their meager size. These islands lobbied hard for commitments going
beyond greenhouse gas reduction, and influenced the adoption of migration-specific language in
Paris.45 Though to an observer the swirl of acronyms and UN working groups names may read
like a bowl of alphabet soup, the act of solidifying specific, purposeful state-based coalitions
signifies a growing ideational strength of Pacific island states internationally.

Changing the Discourse, Changing the Status Quo
The push for recognition of climate refugees has not been solely left to institutional actors
in the UN; rather the most notable push for change has been led by non-governmental actors.
NGOs and Pacific island civil groups have made significant headway in framing island agendas
and representations. Much of NGO work on the subject has been focused on media
representation and outreach programming, and alternative island-based media has played a few
significant roles in broader climate change strategies. Firstly, media helps define the international
climate initiatives of Pacific island states in their broader political agendas. Secondly, media
initiatives have prompted large international powers to act on behalf of smaller states, and have
ultimately aided in shaping political change.
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When it comes to issues involving climate, Sweet attests that an “informed public is the
best single guarantor of sound public policy, especially environmental policy.”46 Media outlets
are intrinsically linked to shaping public opinion and action when it comes to dealing with
climate change, since much of its importance is derived from international media perception.47 In
climate change negotiations, media takes a prominent role in shaping what is to be adopted into
each accord or convention, which has a significant effect on the outcome of the accords
themselves. Pacific-driven media indeed made its way into shaping the agendas for both the
Kyoto and Rio climate conferences, thus demonstrating the success of Pacific islanders in using
alternative media as a way to supplement their smaller diplomatic presence in the UN. The 2009
UNFCCC meeting (COP 15) was groundbreaking in this regard--its direct incorporation of
NGOs and media agencies into the diplomatic process was instrumental in creating a new,
transcendental multilateralism.
In response to the perception of island nations as helpless, somber examples of climate
change, Pacific media agencies have both rejected and reimagined this narrative. Advocates
involved with the Pacific Calling Partnership--an Australian-based NGO focused on promoting
Pacific voices--asked for “respect of the right to exist,” arguing that Kiribati and i-Kiribati are
more than simply “proof” of climate change for a skeptical world.48 Members of these alternative
outlets attest that Pacific islanders are actively fighting the effects of climate change while
simultaneously fighting to be portrayed as human beings with dignity and dreams for the
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future.49 One of the broader missions for alternative media outlets is challenging the notion that
climate change action has to come from Western powers. This framing is challenged by the
adoption of a climate-justice oriented lens that prioritizes grassroots driven mitigation tactics
over infantilizing Western-driven climate policy. Just as other facets in the larger quest towards
climate survival, the success of climate justice is reliant on global media acceptance and the
incorporation of its ideals among international policy-makers.

Slow Violence and Climate Justice
Before attempting to abridge the nuanced, intricate movement that is climate justice, we
first need to understand the context in which it emerged. “Slow violence”--as political scientist
Rob Nixon describes--is a term used to refer to a series of long, structural violence that many
marginalized communities face as the result of serious geo-political, social, and environmental
inequalities. These instances of slow violence can only be understood in conjunction with both
social and ecological forms of oppression, as well as a comprehensive understanding of the
legacies of imperial histories. Environmental degradation has long been exported to poorer
nations through channels of geo-political exploitation and imperial power. Slow violence is both
a product of imperialism, structural inequality and capitalist expansion as a whole.
Scholars of slow violence often note that the expansion of Western capitalism has
committed an inordinate amount of violence against marginalized and indigenous communities.
As Joan Martinez-Alier argues, “The globalizing scale of the contemporary capitalist world
economy means we are seeing more instances of resource extraction conflicts in poor or
indigenous communities brought into the front line of contests about the values of environmental
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resources and services.”50 While these instances of violence that target disenfranchised
populations are just as grave as forms of more direct violence and human rights abuses, they are
often overlooked in our human rights discussions. These violences are felt drastically by those
who suffer from environmental imperialism, yet they often are not as examined or discussed as
“traditional” understandings of violence.
Climate justice is the comprehensive movement that emerged to address the nuanced
foundations of slow, socio-environmental violence. Climate justice refers to claims for greater
equality in both the distribution of climate change impacts, and negotiation power between
actors. A political framework for climate justice would argue for an equal and equitable platform
for developing countries to voice their concerns and argue for substantial climate-based
reforms.51 Part of the climate justice approach in the Pacific islands thus incorporates not just an
emphasis on migration, but also on community-driven action for climate mitigation. This
movement was born to correct the assumption of climate-affected people as inherently agentless
victims. Climate justice predicates itself on the notion that people-driven coalition building has
more impact on creating sustainable solutions to climate change than state-led migratory
legislation and agreements alone.52 One facet of climate justice reforms looks towards
indigenous traditional knowledge as innovative ways for climate change mitigation. Elders in
these Pacific island communities have drawn upon traditional modes of climate adaptation and
have implemented some cosmetic mitigation tactics to their island homes, such as building
artificial breakwalls out of cement and coral.53 Though these initiatives are not enough on their
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own to curb climate change’s destruction, this commitment to grassroots climate change action
emulates a similar dynamic in SIDSs international climate politics.
Moreover, climate justice comes from the standpoint that modern systems of production
have exploited traditionally marginalized communities and have denied them agency over their
own environments. In the Pacific case, this would trace back to the colonial histories and
relationships between island states and their former colonizers. Because many Pacific
environmental issues have root in colonial extraction (such as the US nuclear testing in the
Marshall Islands and Australia-led phosphate depletion in Nauru), climate justice advocates
argue that there needs to be adequate reparations made in regards to this historic exploitative
relationship. Just as our understanding of slow violence attributes its debilitating, expansive
nature to the onset of extractive capitalism, the foundations of climate justice call for a rejection
of capitalist systems and modes of production.
Proponents of climate justice argue that this reparational transition must be made through
the reclaiming of environmental, political, and economic power. Reparational climate justice
initiatives have been adopted into many movements regarding indigenous rights and sovereignty
worldwide; the Standing Rock protests in the US and the Mapuche movements in Chile are
examples of such causes. One can view the Pacific Island nations as a case study in a broader
global movement for climate justice predicated on a resistance against Western hegemony and
fight for indigenous survival. A commitment to true climate justice is a rejection of the human
and environmental exploitation that has been wrought upon the globe by an unchecked, capitalist
imperialism.
Due to its emphasis on historical reparations, the fight for climate justice is inherently
anti-colonial. The coalition building and support networking fostered by small Pacific island
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states is built upon a shared identity as post-colonial nations. In the Pacific, the roots of climate
degradation, exploitation, and migration all stem from the abuses committed under colonialism
and their lasting legacies. As a small island state, to have a voice in international negotiations is
to reject the hegemonic norms established under international institutions. Instead of having their
fate be decided by the United Nations, Pacific island leaders have championed their right to
survival through unconventional means domestically and internationally. Fundamentally, the
push towards the recognition of climate refugees fits into a broader fight towards a more radical
and equalizing climate justice agenda. By understanding climate refugees as a critique of the
broader hegemonic human rights regime, we can begin to understand how these moves towards
Pacific survival have root in anti-colonial practice and thought.

Argument and Discussion of Subsequent Chapters
The fight for climate justice extends far beyond the parameters of a new international
refugee clause. True climate justice comes from a commitment to overhauling our current
climate change diplomatic system and mandating reparations to address the deep colonial trauma
inflicted upon the Global South. While the quest for a complete climate justice regime is a long
term, ambitious process, the success of climate-related migration justice represents a significant
progression of these movements. In order to understand the significance of this move, we must
first look at the intent and impact of our current international legal framework regarding
displacement and asylum. The current working refugee regime has deliberate roots in past power
politics and reinforces an imbalanced relationship between Global North and Global South54
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countries. Throughout this thesis, I aim to understand how these tiny, seemingly geopoliticallyinsignificant islands were so successful in advancing their climate justice agenda within
hegemonic, international institutions. I argue that this diplomatic success is the direct result of
the translation of climate change into captivating media spectacles that caught the attention of
diplomats and international audiences alike. Subsequently, the emotive performances of these
narratives in the UN broke the traditionally stoic norms of diplomacy and challenged our longheld presumption of “rational” discourse. Ultimately, the engaging and captivating imagery
campaign led by a coalition of governmental and non-governmental climate activists brought
about this unprecedented change in an institutional world order predicated on inequality and
deprival of agency.
Chapter 1 will seek to understand how our human rights regime was derived from an
international political scape born out of the rubble of World War II. The success of Pacific
climate activists in the UN is not without significant geopolitical and historic context--to give
adequate reverence to the accomplishments of these small island nations, we must first
understand the background of the position of these Pacific island states. Historically, the Pacific
islands have been the objects of global power politics, not the subject. Many islands in the South
Pacific have at times been held under Western (and Japanese) colonial control, and only recently
gained full political and economic autonomy. The United Nations was chartered as the facilitator
of a new world order, however it was subject to lasting power dynamics and inequalities between
state powers. As exemplified by the creation of the Pacific Territory Trust, (the UN ruling that
gave America undivided control over Micronesia) this global order prioritized power politics
over authentic human rights justice. Subsequent decisions regarding global humanitarian
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migration and refugee status also demonstrate this prioritization of politics over human rights.
America’s colonial rule in Micronesia ushered in a new nuclear age, and with it a new era of
environmental terrorism. The nuclear campaign and the ensuing health and ecological damage in
the Pacific is a clear example of the ‘slow’ violence that colonized people continue to face as a
result of imperial legacies. These legacies shape the social, political, and environmental
inequalities that set the stage for the rise of Pacific climate activism.
Chapter 2 will explore the significance of the Pacific media campaign regarding the
“sinking islands” and related media tropes in the fight for climate justice. This phenomena exists
within the context of our current media scene that prioritizes flashy headlines and share-able
content that evoke strong emotional responses.55 As exemplified by the case of the Marshall
Islands, “slow” violence is often disregarded in our broader discussions of human rights abuses
given its extensive timeframe and nuanced origins. Despite this historic exclusion of slow,
environmental-based violence, Pacific advocates have effectively translated their experience with
environmental violence through a coalition of creative and eye-catching media spectacles. While
our reliance on sudden “spectacular” instances of human rights abuses has historically
disenfranchised proponents of “slow violence” activism, the case of the Pacific Islands
demonstrates that spectacles can also be used as an instrument for bringing widespread attention
to “slow violence.” Pacific activists have harnessed the power of spectacular media images to get
their experience with climate change validated and recognized by international audiences. By
analyzing theories regarding the power of imaginative rhetoric and spectacle, we can analyze not
only how Pacific island coalitions have formed around unifying identities, but also how they
have collectively elicited a strong response from a distant international community. By
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glamorizing their struggles into captivating media narratives, Pacific activists have immortalized
their roles as spokespeople in a climate-progressive future.
Chapter 3 will examine the structural changes to UN debate that allowed for the
translation of these media narratives into discursive action in the United Nations Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) committee meetings. The integration of non-governmental and
independent media voices directly into diplomatic processes made for a more robust, new-age
era of multilateralism. Alongside this structural change came a Pacific-driven overhaul of the
stoic, masculine norms of debate. Emotions have traditionally been omitted from diplomatic
performances, given their connotations with vulnerability and passivity. While emotional
testimony has been typically overlooked given its unprofessional reputation, Pacific diplomats
demonstrate that its selective and strategic use can bring about a particularly strong call to
action.56 The Pacific delegation’s inclusion of dramatic, emotive diplomatic performances
effectively “broke” the norms of stiff, masculine debate etiquette and further progressed the
climate agendas of the Pacific Islands delegations. The adoption of climate migration rulings and
accords is testament to the creative, innovative, and transformative campaign led by an array of
Pacific climate activists. Ultimately, these activists countered their experience with slow
violence and oppressive imperial structures with a creative, collaborative media and diplomatic
alliance. Not only has Pacific representation shaped global imaginations surrounding the brutal
realities of climate change, they have also shattered our conception of what successful diplomacy
looks like.
Overall, the success of the Pacific delegation to the 2015 Paris Accords can be
understood as a creative, collaborative, and strategic rejection of institutional apathy and inaction
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regarding slow violence. While our institutions and media platforms have historically omitted the
experiences of Global South advocates, these Pacific climate justice activists have demonstrated
that media attention and effective diplomatic performances can translate into discursive change
and success internationally. Through a collaboration of both governmental and nongovernmental forces, Pacific island activists have successfully countered our diplomatic
indifference towards systematic injustices and have demanded meaningful climate action from
world leaders. The significance of this campaign in rooted in the longstanding violence and
marginalization that these activists have endured at the hands of the United Nations.
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Chapter 1: Nuclear Warfare--a Human Rights Project

“Tree let your naked arms fall
nor extend vain entreaties to the radiant ball.
This is no gallant monsoon's flash,
no dashing trade wind's blast,
The fading green of your magic
emanations shall not make pure again
these polluted skies . . . for this
is no ordinary sun.”
--No Ordinary Sun, byHone Tuwhare, 1968

On the morning of July 1, 1946, two suns rose over the Eastern horizon above Bikini
Atoll. A snow of ash fluttered over neighboring islands--its shadows a stark contrast to the
blinding flare that woke the morning sky. As Maori poet Hone Tuwhare’s iconic poem details,
the nuclear testing in the Pacific irreversibly changed life in the Pacific and brought forth an era
marked by the unknown--a life awakened by “no ordinary sun.” Though little was known about
the capacity and effects of the American nuclear testing in the Pacific, the nuclear campaign
would shape the lives of the Marshallese into one of forced migration, terminal illness, and a
lasting trauma that would go largely unnoticed to the world’s' eye.
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It would seem contradictory to insist that the nuclear abuse suffered by the Marshallese
was carried out in the name of human rights. It would seem equally contradictory to argue that
the foundations of our current international human rights regime have roots in colonial legacies
and function to uphold state power. However misplaced these ideas might seem in our typical
understanding of human rights, we must analyze the historic inter-state dynamics that shape
international relations and negotiations today. As we look into current and historic instances of
climate-induced migration, we can begin to understand the purpose behind the current lack of
legal frameworks meant to facilitate humanitarian movement.
In order to understand the ideology behind the United Nations, one must first understand
the power dynamics at play leading to its inception. Prior to and during the Second World War,
the world was divided among colonial powers, and many countries in the Global South were held
under European control. At the height of its power, the imperial world system existed within two
planes of operation: the formal and informal empires.57 Formal holdings over land constituted
traditional notions of colonial holdings, while informal empire existed as the perpetuation of
European thought and “soft power.” As the British and American empires began to shed their
formal colonies after the end of World War II, their ideational power was further solidified
within the structure and framework of the United Nations.
The creation of the UN represented a metamorphosis of European imperial power;
instead of dismantling existing forms of colonialism, we see the institutionalization of this power
through the UN framework. Within an introspective analysis of the UN refugee regime, we can
provide further empirical foundation to Anthony Pagdanes’ claim that “Human Rights is a
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development from European efforts to legitimize its overseas empire.”58 The human rights
regime established under the United Nations--especially how it applies to refugee status and
statehood--reinforces the unequal power dynamic that existed under colonial rule. Likewise, the
Refugee Convention of 1951 drew heavily from Cold War agendas and rhetoric, further
legitimizing the political conquests of predominantly Western superpowers. This doctrine was
created as a means to solidify the logistical power of Western states to gain leverage over the
USSR through the specific incorporation of Western-sympathizing individuals into society. The
framework of refugee resettlement is inherently rooted in Western interests rather than any
advancements in seemingly egalitarian, progressive philanthropy. The United Nations is a lasting
testament to the organizational legacy inaugurated by the League of Nations and is linked
through the progression of empire and global order that emerged out of the final decades of
“formal” European colonial rule.59 Understanding the United Nations as a continuation of this
propagation of empire allows us to make broader connections between its principles of Universal
Human Rights, and its fundamentally inadequate refugee program.
The US involvement in the Marshall Islands is particularly exemplative of this imperial
relationship. Originally, the Marshall Islands were held under German imperial power until the
Japanese took control during World War II and institutionalized such control through the League
of Nations. Mitchell-Eaton argues that the institutionalized Japanese colonialism in the islands
set important precedent for later American occupation of the land.60 The staging of the Pacific
military theatre in the islands during World War II also proliferated Western influence
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throughout the region. After the Japanese had lost the war, the United States annexed the
Marshall Islands through the UN-backed Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) which
granted the US “full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory.”61
While the mission of Trusteeships in the UN is to help foster the conditions of independence for
local governance, the United States had clear military and political interests in this acquisition.
The fundamental critiques of the UN as a tool of imperial legacies is exemplified by the
relationship of the US and the Pacific region. The United States’ involvement in Marshall Islands
represents an interest-driven contortion of the human rights framework to best fit the nation’s
individual political goals. In order to understand how the political and militaristic power of the
US inevitably fostered the conditions of migration in the Marshall Islands, we must examine the
implementation of American interests through the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The
TTPI was established under the premise that the citizens of the Marshall Islands needed
America’s help to develop the conditions for independence following the defeat of the Japanese
empire in WWII. Under the Trusteeship, the American government was tasked with protecting
the Marshallese population’s human rights and claim to their ancestral homeland. The US,
however, used the TTPI as a means to justify their nuclear testing and anti-Soviet military
expansion in the Pacific, which came at the detriment of many of their Pacific subjects.
During the period of nuclear testing, the American military forcibly removed Marshall
Islanders from their homelands and resettled them on neighboring atolls. These islanders faced
severe health issues and near starvation as a result of these American military tests and policies.
Despite the destruction of their homelands and abhorrent conditions that they faced at the hands
of the Americans, the Marshallese could legally never be considered a “refugee” under the
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United Nations definition, and therefore never receive any international migratory assistance.
While the condition of the Marshall Islands worsened due to environmental factors, Marshallese
representatives negotiated the Compact of Free Association, which established a system of
bilateral migration to the United States. The Compact established what scholars refer to as
imperial migration--one in which subjects move from their homeland to their colonial power and
can never obtain full rights and benefits of full citizenship. By opting for a limited migration
agreement, the United States can deny subjects the full rights and recognition of refugeehood and
avoid the “bad press” of having committed human rights abuses against its own subjects.
In this chapter, I will explore how the use of the refugee system lends itself to Western
state power, and understand that its fundamental deficiency and inability to adapt to changing
political climates functions to uphold the unequal power structures established under
colonialism. I will first examine the implications of the state-centric model of the United
Nations, and then analyze two conflicting implications of its human rights regime. As a subset of
its human rights regime, I will then discuss how the UN refugee program can be understood both
as a humanitarian lifeline and a mechanism of state power politics. Then, to support the claim
that powerful states use the UN to carry out foreign policy projects, I will introduce the case of
the Marshall Islands. By looking into the United States’ 1946 acquisition of the Marshall Islands
through the UN-granted Pacific Island Trust, we can begin to understand how notions of state
sovereignty and imperialism were shaped by the creation of the United Nations. Then, by
analyzing how the UN refugee regime systematically excludes those fleeing conditions of
colonialism--namely environmental degradation--we can draw connections regarding the intent
and impact of the regime itself. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Refugee
Convention were not borne out of a movement towards universal, egalitarian human rights, but
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rather exist to further support existing global power dynamics and international politics. The
continued use of imperial and political conventions for humanitarian assistance inherently
discriminates against certain human rights abuses, and has led to an international failure to
protect those fleeing environmental and colonial causes.

Interpretations UN’s State-Centric Structure
The creation of the UN in 1945 signified the establishment of a new world order. The
United Nations as an institution predicates itself around the recognition and incorporation of
concrete, defined states. The conceptualization of physical “statehood” is intrinsically a
European political device. As Boaz Atzili argues, “State borders are social constructs. Different
international systems have historically maintained different types of international borders.”62 Our
contemporary notion of a state-based world order emerged because of the power and interests of
global superpowers. This is exemplified in the makeup of the United Nations’ Security Council,
which prioritizes the interests of the 5 victors of WWII with permanent positions in the decision
making branch of the UN. The institutionalization of states was not only something that
reinforced existing global superpowers, it also laid out the foundations for state building for
former colonies as well.63
The institutionalization of finite states had significant effects on the nations in the “global
periphery.” As Hamza Alavi analyzes, many post colonial states underwent a period of
institutional instability following decolonization movements due to the underdevelopment of
internal independent political mechanisms. The establishment of the United Nations was an
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apparent multilateral stride towards a coveted “global governance.”64 While this concept was
framed as something entirely new and revolutionary, Craig Murphy understands the phenomena
of global governance as a concept dating back to the 1850s, when colonial rule and empire were
at their height.65 It was during the height of European colonialism and imperial rule under which
a primary “global governance” was first established. The relations and interactions of defined
territories were already functioning within the framework of imperial rule--the United Nations
simply institutionalized such dynamics after the fall of formal colonial systems.
By putting these existing powers into privileged seats on the UN Security Council, the P5
nations gave themselves the power to decide the status of former colonies such as the Marshall
Islands. The Security Council members had the jurisdiction to declare disputed territories as
independent “states” or as dependent “trust territories.”66 While the United Nations outwardly
prides itself on being an inclusive forum for sovereign nations, its state-centric model allowed
for already-powerful states to determine the political status of territories worldwide. Evidently,
this model reflects a power dynamic reminiscent of colonialism.
Aside from dominating the actual framework of the organization, the state-centric model
of the United Nations also undergirds its human rights regime. States have the inherent power to
recognize human rights, even though they are not attributed as the distributors or creators of such
individual freedoms.67 The 1947 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) places the
practice of Human Rights protection on state governments and reinforces the state as the primary
international decision-makers. Likewise, the foundations of the UDHR defines human rights as
Weiss, Thomas, “The united nations, before, during, and after 1945,” Oxford University Press, 2015.
Murphy, Craig ,“Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood,” International Affairs, Vol 76: 4,
October 2000 .
66 Cox, Larry, & Yoo, John, "Are human rights universal?" The Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 1 , 9-20.
2009.
67 Cox, Larry, & Yoo, John, "Are human rights universal?" The Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 1 , 9-20.
2009.
64
65

Schneck 40

something inherently political and tied to statehood. These political leanings and interpretations
of rights have therefore shaped both the intent and impact of the international UN human rights
regime.

Interpretations of the Human Rights Regime: Universally Philanthropic v. Western-Centric
There are two primary interpretations of the influence of the Human Rights regime. The
first and most-commonly-held interpretation attributes the creation of the UN Declaration of
Human Rights as progressive and altruistic; the second examines the regime as hegemonic
Western doctrine that reinforces Western political thought and power. The most commonlyaccepted theory for the creation of the international human rights regime is that it was born out
of a universal understanding of the “Rights of Man.”68 Larry Cox, a scholar on the origins of the
United Nations, argues that this push towards the Declaration of Human Rights was the result of
a universal commitment towards human rights doctrine and cohesion of multilateral
interpretations, as well as the conglomeration of diversified values and cultural norms, of the
inherent rights of man. To Cox, human rights are unique in that they have been the only political
and moral idea to have received universal acceptance.”69
Similarly, Jamie Mayerfield argues for the intrinsic values of institutionalized human
rights. She believed that the principles and philosophy behind human rights are able to withstand
the critiques of cultural relativism.70 Mayersfield attests that there must be a formalized legal
backing of human rights laws in order to uphold and solidify its legitimacy. To scholars like
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Mayersfield, the only way we can adequately protect human rights is by consistently adapting
and amending the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While we can critique the UDHR for
how accurately it speaks for the inherent rights of man, we cannot deny the actual principles of
human rights themselves. Additionally, Mayerfield argues that the Declaration deliberately
leaves many subjects open for individual and collective judgement. The interpretative aspect of
the Declaration of Human Rights, however, leads to many contradictory implementations of such
human rights principles.
While typically the United Nations’ human rights program is examined in a positive light,
much emerging literature has focused on the imperial origins and hypocritical nature of the
program.71 Despite the apparent display of universalist philanthropy, the discourse around
creating the UN borrowed heavily from established European imperialist thought.72 Critical
human rights thinkers therefore argue that the United Nations can never completely remove itself
from its ideological predecessor, the League of Nations. Because the League of Nations was a
colonial institution meant to uphold imperial systems, the United Nations--as the organizational
child of the League--will inherently propagate these principles. Mark Mazower also highlights
that many of the notable thinkers and scholars behind the League and the UN had interests in
maintaining the imperial powers of their nation-states.
Similar interpretations of the human rights regime attribute its inception as a product of
Western imperial thought, and an institutionalization of both soft and rigid forms of Western
ideological hegemony. Scholars such as Jack Donnelly look towards the declaration itself as a
mirror image of fundamental Western constitutions such as those of the United States and

71

Mayerfeld, Jamie, "Human rights," In The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, Democratic
Legitimacy, and International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.
72 Mazower, Mark, “No enchanted palace: the end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations.”
Princeton University Press, 2009.

Schneck 42

France.73 The ideas of personal freedom, speech, and human dignity arose from European
scholarly discourse and was hardly a collaboration of the intellectual traditions of diverse
cultures. As we can clearly discern how Western ideology shaped the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, we must ask ourselves how does this Western-centrism affect our human rights
responses, and more specifically our international refugee program?

Interpretations of the UN Refugee Regime: Philanthropy v. Power Politics
A fundamental facet of the larger human rights regime, the UN’s refugee program
functions as a prime example of the “extraterritorial obligations” of states. In the eyes of Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Refugees are human rights violations made visible.”74 Scholarly debate on
the UN refugee regime therefore follows a split similar to that of the broader literature on human
rights: the UNHCR refugee system is seen as either a just, charitable means of ensuring
individual liberties, or a political smokescreen for international power politics.
The protection of refugees under international law is significant in several regards. While
the protection and benefits of “refugee” individuals may vary between countries, there are certain
benefits that are typically universal. Firstly, refugees resettled in a new country have the ability
to work and bring immediate family members into host nations. In the United States, refugees
are given priority status for green card applications after one year of residence in the country.75
With a green card, immigrants have permanent legal status in the country and can access benefits
such as social security and medicare after a certain period of time. Achieving refugee status
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makes the migration process more streamlined and efficient--while in some cases obtaining
“legal” migration to the US can take upwards of 20 years,76 refugee status can (in theory)
expedite this process. This, however, is contingent on the host country’s commitment to
incorporating asylum seekers, and can take a considerable amount of time depending on how
politicized their conflicts are globally. Regardless of the political status of individuals within a
particular country, refugee status itself provides asylum seekers with legal protection and
recognition within the international community.
At a deeper ideological level--as Mark Franken argues--international responses to refugee
influxes appeals to the moral high ground of high-receiving nations like the United States. This
interpretation helps to reinforce the notion that the UN’s refugee regime stems from altruistic
intentions.77 Yet, even though the appeals to accept refugees is made in moral terms, the very
fact that these appeals have to be made underscores the fact that the refugee system itself
prioritizes the demands of receiving nations over the needs of sending countries--each individual
receiving state can lay out exactly the number and demographics of asylum-seekers they are
willing to incorporate.78 This means that countries who are on the receiving end of the refugee
process have the upper-hand in shaping the realities of displaced persons. The uneven dynamic
between state powers was in fact exemplified during the drafting of the Refugee Convention in
1951.
During the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Western nations dominated the
discussion; out of the 26 states participating in the discussion, 21 were in Western Europe.79 The
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Soviet Union was conveniently excluded from these talks and did not have a say on drafting the
convention; the refugee regime was after all intended as an anti-communist political bargaining
tool of the West to expand their ideological sphere of influence against the Soviet Union. The
1951 Convention itself defines a refugee as someone who is fleeing persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, membership to a certain social group, or political opinion.80 Under this
model, receiving countries typically chose which refugees they would accept based on a political
rationale.81 During the Cold-War era, this encouraged countries like the US to accept individuals
who were fleeing communist rule in Eastern Europe, especially from countries such as East
Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Political refugees from these countries were seen as
potential spies or harborers of vital information on the inner workings of the USSR and its
satellite states across Eastern Europe. Because of the language of the Refugee Convention,
democratically-leaning individuals were particularly protected under the “refugee” title. Though
the Cold-War dynamic has since faded from the international stage, the current refugee system
still exists under its original, communist-centric definition. The criteria for refugee status is
intrinsically linked to political status internationally. This same political preference was given to
pro-government individuals fleeing El Salvador in the 1980 Civil War who looked to seek
asylum in the United States. Because these individuals were fleeing communist and anti-Western
forces, they were accepted and given preferential refugee status.82 The United States’ Cold-Wardriven interest in the conflict prompted the Reagan administration to pass the 1980 Refugee Law
that allowed for the expedited processing of El Salvadoran refugees during this time period.
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Critics of the UN Refugee resettlement system often argue that the 1951 Refugee Convention is
not a humanitarian doctrine, but rather an anti-communist one.83
Because of this heavily-politicized definition, the Refugee Convention excludes
individuals seeking protection from issues unrelated to political persecution. This politicized
definition of a “refugee” excludes individuals who are fleeing economic or environmental
destruction, which creates legal and political gray areas in states deeply affected by
environmental destruction like the Marshall Islands. Despite the clear need for humanitarianbased migration in these cases, the United Nations still relies on its dated, insufficient refugee
doctrine. This inability to adapt the refugee system to account for changing political problems
such as climate change and environmental degradation shows the inherent Western biases of the
international order and a fundamental lacking on the part of the UN Human Rights regime.
Likewise, this outlook ignores the human rights abuses and neglect caused by neo-imperial
oversight of trusteeship holdings like the United States’ control over the Pacific islands.

The Trusteeship Council
When the United Nations was formed in 1945, its founding states came together to
propose a system that would supposedly honor the independence and sovereignty of the world's
nations. Yet, the structure of the United Nations was based on existing power dynamics of WWII
and entitled the five victors of the war to permanent seats on the executive Security Council. At
its inception, these United Nations founders established the Trusteeship Council, which oversaw
the political administration of 11 “trust territories” extending from British Cameroon and Italian
Somalia in Africa to the American oversight of Micronesia in the Pacific. The Trusteeship
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Council was in turn to be run by the five members of the Security Council--China, France, the
Soviet Union, the UK and the US--which came to become known as the P5. Trusteeship in the
United Nations occupies an almost contradictory status to the organization’s founding principles
of global sovereignty; the United Nations Trusteeship Council was officially meant to create an
organ to “promote the advancement of the inhabitants of Trust Territories in their progressive
development in self-governance and independence,”84 while overseeing the political, economic
and administrative functions of a territory. Basically, the UN would grant trusteeship of a
territory to a guardian nation-state in order for the parent state to help the territory to “develop”
the conditions for independence.
At the Yalta Convention of 1945, P5 leaders agreed that territorial trusteeship would
apply only to existing League of Nations mandates, territories detached from the enemy as a
result of war, and any other territory that might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.85 This
means that the P5 members of the UN would then be responsible for the oversight and
governance of any territory seized from the losing empires of WWII. Tellingly, the members also
agreed that “all Trust Territories would have a clearly recognized right to eventual selfdetermination, but that in some cases the administering authority would have the right to fortify
its territory, a power denied under the League, for international peace and security.”86
In 1947, the United Nations declared the Pacific region of Micronesia a “Strategic Trust”
of the United States of America. A “Strategic Trust” differed from other UN Trusteeships in that
it allowed the administering authority to fortify and close any parts of the strategic area for
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“security reasons.” The task of promoting "security" and "ensuring peace" within the territory of
a strategic trust was left deliberately open and interpretive, so as to grant the overseeing country
as much freedom in their administration of the region. As the TTPI gave the United States
exclusive control of these islands for an indefinite amount of time, the United States took this
opportunity to "promote security" in the Pacific region through the establishment of key military
hubs in the Marshall Islands during the 1940s and ’50s. These Marshallese bases coalesced with
bases in Okinawa and Hawaii to lay the foundation for what military scholars refer to as the
"American Lake” of the North Pacific.87 Following WWII,
In particular, the US had two key military interests in the Pacific region. Firstly, the
acquisition of the islands gave the United States ample space and authority to conduct tests of its
newly developed nuclear arsenals. Between 1946 and 1958, the United States conducted over
one hundred nuclear tests throughout the Pacific--namely on Bikini and Eronawak atolls. Sasha
Davis states, “Simply put, the first presentation of American hegemony to the world was
performed on the stage of Bikini Atoll.”88 Secondly, the US wanted to oversee the strategic
Pacific region in order to prevent the spread of Soviet ideological and military influence. While
at first the nuclear tests themselves acted as a display of American weaponry and military might,
the continued American presence in the Marshall Islands after the end of the nuclear program
signified an economic and ideological claim of the region. Ultimately, the United States used the
UN Trusteeship Council to levy its own military and political interests in the Pacific Islands; to
this end, Washington maintained veto power over any actions by the governments of Pacific
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island territories that it considered adverse to American security interests.89 With these security
interests in mind, we can understand how the United States used the UN Trusteeship to carry out
its own foreign policy agendas rather than altruistically promote “conditions for
independence.”90

US Nuclear Testing
The nuclear bombing of Bikini Atoll produced the iconic imagery of massive mushroom
clouds over an expansive Pacific Ocean. What is lesser known, however, is what happened to the
population of Marshallese who called Bikini their home. In July of 1946, the United States
military forcibly removed 167 native Bikinians from the island and relocated them to Rogonerik
atoll--an atoll that was considerably smaller than Bikini and lacked a coral barrier reef. The
decision to use Bikini as a test site came from the US military’s desire to conduct testing in a
remote, isolated place that would cause as little damage to military vessels or personnel as
possible. As the US continued with their nuclear violence against the Bikinians, the commodore
overseeing the nuclear project in the Pacific explained to the islanders that they were a “chosen
people” whose sacrifice would benefit “the future of mankind.”91
On Rogernerik, the American Trust Territory administration had only left the Marshallese
with a few weeks’ worth of food and supplies. Here, many Bikinians grew ill and malnourished

89

Smith-Norris, Martha, "Negotiating a cold war treaty: the united states, the marshall islands, and the compact of
free association." Domination and Resistance: The United States and the Marshall Islands during the Cold War,
125-51. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.
90 Smith-Norris, Martha, "Negotiating a cold war treaty: the united states, the marshall islands, and the compact of
free association." Domination and Resistance: The United States and the Marshall Islands during the Cold War,
125-51. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016.
91
N.a “The marshall islands,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, The National Museum of Nuclear Science and History.
Online. N.d.

Schneck 49

due to the radioactivity present in their fish supplies, as well as the lack of natural resources.92 As
the United States continuously ignored their request for more supplies, the small population of
resettled Bikinians faced near starvation.93 Under the administration of the strategic trust, the
United States was tasked with "promoting the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the
inhabitants, and [protecting] the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources."94 The
United States had not only failed to uphold their promise of the protection of the Marshallese
people and their homelands, the United Nations also denied the Marshallese protection of their
human rights.
The continued bombings of Bikini and Enewatak atolls also caused severe harm to
neighboring islanders with little to no advanced warning or communication from the Trust
Territory Administration. Leading up to the Baker test--the first test of the Hydrogen bomb,
which was over 1,000 times as powerful as the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki--the
US did not inform islanders about the tests that would be conducted. As the nuclear fallout from
the massive explosion made its way to neighboring inhabited atolls, observers reported
Marshallese children playing in the white, flakey nuclear fallout like snow. Unknowing of its
potential effects, many children had put the fallout into their mouths and fell severely ill.95
After their relocation by the US government, the Marshallese filed a complaint with the
United Nations in 1948 on the basis that their human rights and homeland had been violated by
the nuclear testing on Bikini and Enewetak. In 1948, the United Nations rejected the Marshallese
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complaint against the US’s nuclear testing on Bikini atoll. This rejection comes less than a year
after the UN had formally passed the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
Following the tests on Bikini, the United States continued its pattern of relocating entire
island populations. In the 1950s, the US military offered to resettle Bikinians to their original
homeland, despite scientific indications that the island was still too radioactive to sustain human
life. Following many relocations and resettlements, many islanders ended up on Enewetak and
Kili atolls. Many years after the official nuclear test programs, the threat of nuclear
contamination in the Marshall Islands is still very much present. On Enewetak atoll, the United
States disposed of 3.1 million cubic feet worth of radioactive soil and debris in a large concrete
dome named Runit.96 The dome--or nuclear “tomb” as many Marshallese call it--is now starting
to leak due to rising sea levels and tides, and threatens the local Marshallese population. The
combination of nuclear legacies and climate change has made the living conditions in the
Marshall Islands increasingly precarious.
Likewise, in 2011, Kili atoll was subject to major flooding and coastal inundation as the
result of a particularly bad cyclone season. Many people found their homes flooded and the small
airport runway--which is the atoll’s sole connection and access to imported supplies--entirely
unusable. If the second home of these Bikinians also becomes uninhabitable, where can these
individuals go? As climate change continues to threaten these particularly vulnerable
communities, migration becomes increasingly inevitable.
The International Organization on Migration--the branch of the United Nations tasked
with documenting and facilitating migration--argues that there is seldom just one reason
propelling people to migrate. In the case of the Pacific Islands, while environmental forces have
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brought forth many challenges to the local populations, climate change has largely acted as a
catalyst that worsened existing conditions for migration. These existing conditions primarily are
economic and social in nature and have been shaped by the nuclear histories and conditions of
these Pacific nations. The American military expansion and nuclear testing in the region has also
altered how Marshallese interact with their island home and created the pockets of urbanized
communities on certain atolls. Factors like access to natural resources, self-governance, and
urbanization are all key in shaping Pacific migration and responses to climate change. Under the
oversight of the American Trust Territory, the wellbeing of the Marshallese population came
second to the political interests of the American military.

Cold War interests in the Pacific
In addition to the increased nuclear testing in the region, The United States looked at the
Pacific Trust Territory as a way to preserve its own security interest against the Soviet Union.
During the height of the Cold War, American involvement in the Pacific region was “useful as
both a potential defensive barrier against Soviet expansion and a springboard for the projection
of American power.”97 The positioning of American vessels and nuclear arsenal in the Marshall
Islands served two primary functions. Firstly, it served as the first defense against the Soviets
should the US find a need for military action. Part of the impetus behind creating the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands was for the United States to push out any other competing powers
in the region. In the event of Soviet hostilities or attacks, air and sea communications would need
to be passed through Micronesia. By taking control of these communication ways, the United
States could effectively protect itself against any potential Pacific standoff.
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Secondly, the continued American presence signified the ideological dominance of
Western ideals and values in the region. To many scholars and historians, the 20th Century is
marked as the “American Century” in which the United States solidified its global hegemonic
world power. During the Cold War, this power was solidified in an effort to “maintain strong
economic, political, and military presence in the Pacific.”98 Alongside the quest for ideological
leverage against the Soviets, the United States was very much concerned with its image as an
international powerhouse. Though the US had received international backlash and negative
publicity regarding its nuclear testing in the Pacific, it still wanted to be respected as a global
superpower and champion of human rights.
Throughout the Cold War, the United States looked to advance this ideological
hegemony in the Pacific in multiple ways. In the 1960s, President Kennedy proclaimed his desire
to further incorporate the Trusteeship into the United States because of the economic interests of
maintaining control of the shipping region.99 As the Marshallese pressed the United States
administration for more local autonomy and recognition, however, the US had to adapt their
strategy so as to avoid appearing as a total colonial power in the region. By the 1980s, the
United States looked to rebrand their imperial control over Micronesia through the Compact of
Free Association--a bilateral agreement that recognized the Marshall Islands as a state in “close
association” with the United States.

Preserving Imperial Legacies: Adapting the Compact of Free Association
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In 1986, the Marshallese community leaders signed the Compact of Free Association
with the United States. The Compact marked the formal end to the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, and granted apparent independence to the Marshall Islands. The Compact of Free
Association is the equivalent of a treaty--it represents a negotiation with the United States on the
revocable political independence of Micronesia.100 Officially, the islands were labelled as a
Freely Associated State that the United States had “the obligation to keep in a close relation”
with itself. The Compact--though forged with the outward attempt to grant the Marshall Islands
full autonomy and sovereignty over their land-- reinstated existing American imperial power in
the region. At a time of heightened Cold War competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union, the United States wanted a way to continue their presence in the Pacific informally
so as to avoid appearing as a colonial presence in the region. Additionally, the United States
found it more cost effective to carry out its interests through the Compact rather than full-out
institutional oversight through the TTPI.101
While the Compact of Free Association was meant to give more autonomy to the
Marshallese people, many scholars view the move to make the Marshall Islands a "Freely
Associated State" as a thinly-veiled attempt at reinforcing American imperial control over the
islands. Michael Walsh describes how the United States continues to use language in formal
documents to indicate that these islands are still not sovereign. In the Department of Defense’s
2018 report, the US classified the “Marshall Islands” under “US / US Territories.”102 Pacific
scholar Emily Mitchell-Eaton explains how the shift towards the Compact Agreement also

100

Ballendorf, Dirk Anthony, “The new freely-associated states of micronesia: their natural and social
environmental challenges.” GeoJournal, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 137–142. 1988,
101
Walsh, Michael Edward, “The sovereignty of freely associated states in the indo pacific,” The Islands Society, 10
June 2019.
102
Walsh, Michael Edward, “The sovereignty of freely associated states in the indo pacific,” The Islands Society, 10
June 2019.

Schneck 54

solidified an American geographic imagination that extended its reach across the Pacific.103 This
American imagined community was very much militaristic in nature--while the US wanted to
incorporate the Marshall Islands as a military holding, it was reluctant to fully advocate for the
protection of Marshallese human rights and agency. This is evident in the US’s inadequate
means of addressing Marshallese economic and migratory distress.
The Compact of Free Association referenced the relationship that the US would have
with the Marshall Islands in regards to economic aid. In 1988, the Marshallese government
established the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, which allowed the Marshallese to demand
compensation for the abuses they suffered under the US nuclear testing. However, this
compensation has in no way been sufficient. The tribunal concluded the United States should pay
$2.3 billion in reparations, but Congress and US courts have refused. Documents show the US
paid just $4 million.104 By 2009, The Nuclear Claims Tribunal had completely exhausted its
funding from the US government. By this time, over half of the valid claimants had died waiting
to receive any sort of compensation from the US Government.105 Congress has no intention of
refilling the fund for the affected Marshallese, and has resisted external pressures to carry out
their commitment to assist the islanders.
Because of the US’s dominance within the United Nations, the UN has done next to
nothing to hold the US accountable for its actions in the Marshall Islands even though the case of
the nuclear testing in the Pacific constitutes as abuse of the human and environmental rights of
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the Marshallese.106 In turn, as they are unable to make their claim for refugee status through the
United Nations, the Compact of Free Association has become the only resource available to the
Marshallese. Quite significantly, the Compact lays out specific clauses regarding the right of the
Marshallese to migrate to the United States. Under the Compact, Marshall Islanders can travel
and work in the United States without obtaining visas.107 However, while they can legally work
in the US, the Marshallese have to go through the same naturalization process as other regular
migrants--there is no special program for them to obtain full legal status. As per the Compact
Agreement, social security taxes are removed from their paychecks, but as a consequence,
Marshallese immigrants in the US can never receive social security or Medicaid.108 Likewise,
Compact immigrants, unless they go through the regular naturalization process, can never
participate in American politics. These obstacles remain particularly problematic for poor
Marshallese immigrants who have lasting health problems relating to exposure to nuclear fallout;
many of these communities have higher rates of thyroid cancer and leukemia.109
Mitchell-Eaton argues that this relationship denotes the Marshallese to an imperial
migrant status that deprives Marshallese of certain services in the US. To Mitchell-Eaton, the
Compact imposes an imperial identity upon the Marshallese and subjects them to a loss of their
indigeneity and agency. Had the Marshallese been able to claim official refugee status through
the UN refugee regime, they would have enjoyed expedited green-card processing and greater
access to social benefits within the United States These benefits were not awarded to the
Marshallese because the refugee system prioritizes political interests over true humanitarian
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need. The UN refugee system fails to protect the most vulnerable individuals from environmental
violence and thereby forces them into inequal migratory relationships like the one established
under the Compact of Free Association.

Conclusion and Ways Forward
By understanding the legacies of the American interest in the TTPI, we can begin to
understand the claim that “historical precedent of U.S. colonial power in the Pacific region has
carved out grooves—institutionally, territorially, culturally, even in the landscape itself—that
have enabled new permutations of empire, both in the Pacific and around the world.”110 The
Marshall Islands can give us a broader understanding of the fundamental flaws of the United
Nations human rights regime. The politicization of the UN’s human rights framework stems
from the creation of the UN itself as the organization reinforcing state-centric models of
governance. The structure of the UN gave significant power to P5 members, who had the power
to determine the status of “states” and “dependent territories.” Likewise, the UN gave power to
these nations to determine the missions of human rights doctrine and programs, through which
they could carry out their own interests. As the US took control of the Marshall Trust Territory,
the United States has systematically contorted its mission as a guardian of the Pacific islands to
carry out its military, economic, and political endeavors.
By putting the Marshallese people under the control of the American military, not only
were the Marshallese denied autonomy, they were also subject to human rights abuses that had
lasting effects on their health and societal wellbeing. The case of the Marshall Islands
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exemplifies the abuse of United Nations powers in multiple ways. Firstly, the legal denial of
sovereignty under the UN trusteeship framework inhibited the Marshallese from developing their
own self-sufficient political autonomy. The trusteeship granted the full custodial rights of the
land to the United States, which in turn controlled the economic, political, and environmental
status of the territory. The American guardianship over Marshallese lands allowed the US to raze
entire islands through nuclear testing and forcefully remove indigenous populations from their
ancestral homes. This relocation of the Marshallese people by the American military was done
with little respect to the ecological functions of these islands, which resulted in the nearstarvation of entire island populations. The United Nations rejected the Marshallese’s complaint
against the American trusteeship and allowed the United States to continue its nuclear program,
despite clear evidence that the human rights of the Marshallese were abused. Systematically, the
United States fostered conditions that progressively made the Marshall Islands uninhabitable and
forced increasingly desperate individuals to migrate. Despite these clear abuses, the Marshallese
are excluded from the UN human rights regime because neo-colonial arrangements made their
plight a matter of internal US affairs, and the United States--as one of the P5 countries--is not
subject to UN scrutiny.
The Compact of Free Association established an alternative form of migration that
allowed the US to deny access to certain benefits that would have been mandated under refugee
status. Though the United States arguably fostered the conditions forcing Marshallese to migrate
under its administration, it has systematically denied them access to social services and funding
for necessary health care. The Compact itself was dually driven by a Marshallese desire for full
independence and sovereignty, as well as an American desire to upkeep its hegemonic control in
the Pacific. Though outwardly created with the intent to grant Marshallese independence, the
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Compact of Free Association still does not fully recognize the Marshall Islands as an
independent nation. The continued administrative claim over the islands signifies the imperial
control that the United States has over the region, and the lack of international attention devoted
to the infringement of sovereignty committed by the US. By allowing migration of the
Marshallese on the basis of imperial identity, the US government created a system in which the
Marshallese did not have any access to social services or medical benefits. With the Compact,
the US could circumvent the humanitarian obligation it had towards the Marshallese while also
maintaining its image as a champion of universal human rights.
Ultimately, what we consider worthy of humanitarian action is entirely contingent on
politicized Western notions of humanitarian causes. This creates significant problems when we
look at possible international solutions to massive global humanitarian crises such as climate
change and environmental degradation. Despite the violations of the Marshallese’s human rights
under American administration, these individuals do not qualify for asylum under the UN
definition. This is due to the political intent of the Refugee Convention at its founding. Because
the definition of asylum was drawn with political interests in mind rather than a humanitarian
intent, Refugee status is solely limited to those fleeing political persecution. At the inception of
the 1951 Refugee Convention, Western Powers had no interest in resettling refugees fleeing the
conditions of their extractive colonialism rule--their focus was mainly confined to Westernsympathizing individuals fleeing Soviet persecution. The preferential status of Hungarian
Refugees in the 1950s and El Salvadoran Refugees in the 1980s exemplifies this political focus.
To global powers, refugees were objects of power politics, not individuals with a legitimate
claim to humanitarian assistance.
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However, while the case of the Marshall Islands highlights a fundamental flaw in the
current human rights regime, it does not mean that this system cannot be adapted to better
address current humanitarian issues. The existing refugee regime represents an overwhelming
emphasis on the political aspects of human rights. In order to make substantial change to the
limited UN framework, we must adapt the parameters of the refugee convention to incorporate
those fleeing economic and environmental disasters, as well as socio-political neglect from
colonial legacies. Recent discursive change in the UNFCCC’s 2015 Paris Accords in fact
suggests that the prospect of a new global migration system that includes those fleeing
environmental forces may not be a far-fetched dream despite the imperial origins of the UN
refugee regime. The Accords themselves noted the small island nations in the Pacific as
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change and proposed the creation of an
international body specifically dedicated to dealing with climate change displacement. Much of
the headway for these legislative adaptations has come from Pacific island representatives
themselves and indicate these island nations’ diplomatic success. Having forums and working
groups that amplify the voices of small, “developing” nations in the UN can help us amend
problematic and insufficient human rights legislation. Currently, we are not dealing with the
same global order that shaped Human Rights doctrine in the 1940s and ’50s. While obviously
there still remains stark power inequalities among nations, the change that we see in the Paris
Accords could indicate the growing strength of post-colonial, small island states in an
international system dominated by hegemonic powers.
The case of the Marshall Islands represents one of a widely-ignored and institutionalized
“slow violence” that is derived from both environmental and social marginalization. These forms
of humanitarian abuses are often removed from our larger human rights discussions because they
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require a nuanced understanding of imperial legacies. In a much similar vein, the Pacific’s wider
experience with climate change and environmental degradation can be understood as a product
of this slow violence. Having their experience realized in international negotiation bodies
represents a reframing of the institutional and historical violence they continue to face as a result
of climate change.
The diplomatic change that we see in regards to the Pacific in turn took place because of
unique and powerful performative strategies by Pacific climate activists. Their cohesive identity
construction through media narratives surrounding climate change has allowed for such an
unprecedented success in the UN’s climate change proceedings. By looking into how the Pacific
delegations and media organizations have translated their experience with slow environmental
violence into international media spectacles, we can begin to understand the significance of their
activist frameworks.
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Chapter 2: Spectacles and Slow Violence

I initially undertook this thesis project with the intent to explore the political
ramifications of entire island nations sinking beneath the ocean. It seemed like a myth--a tragic
tale of a modern Atlantis slipping away from existence forever, only to be remembered in painful
retellings of warm childhood afternoons spent snacking on dishes of coconut and pulaka and
fishing in the lagoon. The images of pristine coastlines and crystal clear waters added to the
mournful tragedy of it all; it seemed so cruel that the most beautiful, most innocent nations in the
world would be the first to perish at the hands of human-induced climate change. The Pacific
islands would be the first martyrs of the modern environmental crisis, and what would be left to
show for it? How incredibly puzzling of a situation it would leave the UN, who would eventually
be tasked with deciding the future of Pacific cultures, migration and citizenship.
I now realize the reason I and many other researchers have been so intrigued by this
subject is the result of the persuasive media messaging on the Pacific. This question of what to
do with the “sinking islands”--a phrase that is widely used and accepted even in international
policy forums--is very much a misnomer. No, the Pacific Islands are not sinking. The water is in
fact, rising around them. Climate change in the Pacific is multi-faceted and not as simple as a
matter of land slipping beneath the ocean, but complexity is not what gets people clicking on
news articles. Whether or not these media narratives are scientifically accurate is entirely beside
the point. They did their job, and they did it well--they demanded the attention of international
audiences to the environmental violence and injustice that Pacific communities face on a daily
basis. I am proof of the success of such a narrative.
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The question that then emerges is how have these narratives been so successful, and who
is behind it all? Pacific activists and media organizations have fought for recognition in a world
that so often overlooks structural violence against marginalized communities. The unbalanced
nature of our international negotiation forums means that the issues concerning industrialized
nations oftentimes stunts the progress of any grassroots environmental movements. The notable
success of this media and political campaign is a feat that deserves to be recognized and
examined in broader context. In this chapter, I will argue that media preference towards
spectacular imagery does not detract from environmentalism in the Pacific, but rather activists
have creatively and carefully dramatized narratives of environmental violence into consumable
and eye-catching, grandiose spectacles. Instead of allowing the slow and historical
environmental violence inflicted on Pacific communities to fade into obscurity, tenacious Pacific
activists have effectively flipped the script of slow violence inflicted on their community into a
dramatic ballad of media stunts and images. The approach of Pacific island activists prioritizes
agency and rigor over the submissive position they have been forced into in international accords
and traditional negotiation.
These spectacular Pacific media narratives exist in an international space that is
increasingly cognizant of structural violence and has helped draw attention to the linkages
between social and economic rights with the global threats of climate change. Over the last
twenty years, climate science has in turn experienced a “triumphant rise to political saliency”111
and has provided a space to voice the concerns of communities affected by environmental
degradation and change.112 For centuries, many colonial and post-colonial states have
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experienced threats to their environmental and social wellbeing. However, this type of long-term,
systematic violence is something that has been largely overlooked in international media
contexts. Quite simply, the slow, structural violence faced by former colonial subjects was not as
a concern to international media because it is not as sudden, “flashy,” or consumable as other
human rights abuses. This attentional bias towards “spectacular” instances of violence has
created an unequal response in international support and has limited the platform for victims and
advocates to voice their experience with violence and human rights abuses.
In order to bring “mundane” environmental inequalities to a level of true political
saliency, Pacific activists have undertaken a transformative media overhaul that has reimagined
environmental issues as inherently political. In order to demand action from governments at the
helm of international climate diplomacy, climate activists have formed networks of support on
the basis of a shared, common identity. Through these networks, activists have promoted Pacific
environmental values and interests through eye-catching, innovative media campaigns and stunts
that capture the attention of international onlookers. Strategically employing a “spectacle” of
intriguing language, visuals, and dramatics, Pacific island activists have harnessed the power of
their situation into bargaining power on the world stage. Through both a coalition of state and
non-state actors, Pacific networks of support have changed global perspectives on the prospect of
climate change realities and diplomacy and have forced us to reexamine what it means to be the
“victim” of climate change.

Environmentalism of the Poor
There are many explanations as to why environmental abuses have not been awarded an
adequate examination in our contemporary media frameworks. Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and
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the Environmentalism of the Poor argues that environmental forms of violence have not shared
the same political leverage and outcry of many other human rights abuses because they occur
over a larger time frame and require a much more nuanced explanation as to their origins.
Talking about structural, colonial, and environmental oppressions are not well received in media
frameworks because they are not as easily consumable as other violences. They simply do not fit
into a media world driven by clicks, shares, retweets, and hasty snippets of airtime on news
networks. While large, sudden human rights abuses send shockwaves across the world, the
creeping threats of climate change and environmental degradation make little headway in media
spaces. The attentional biases of media sources prioritize these spectacular cases of violence and
destruction over slower structural causes of destruction.

Slow violence in the Marshalls
The Marshall Islands are an example of what Rob Nixon would describe as the victims of
slow, everyday violence. Long past the official “end” to the US nuclear campaign in the region,
the Marshallese are still suffering from the colonial violence that irreversibly altered the
environmental foundation of their homeland and has forced them into an unequal political and
migratory relationship with their former colonizer. Though subjects of a gruesome nuclear
campaign, the Marshallese victims are not remembered in the same solemn way as those who
suffered from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Because the trauma suffered by
the Marshallese was not spectacular or instantaneous enough to become entrenched in our
historical memory and pop culture, it would fade into the margins of textbooks and slowly
disappear into the folds of history. Slow violence is the silent killer of international sympathy
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and recognition--its victims do not go out in a celebratory funeral of canons and parades, but
rather in a whisper.
Western human rights discourse leaves little room for nuanced discussions of the legacies
of colonial empires and the systematic violence that they have inflicted on the Global South. The
case of the Marshall Islands is exemplative of the entrenched slow violence of history that has
permeated past the historical “end” of imperialism and into modern inter-state dynamics. Yet, the
Marshall Islands are not unique within the Pacific region in their struggles against the slow
violence of enviro-imperialism. In Nauru, the hyper-extraction of phosphate under German
occupation has left the island nation economically dependent on an immigration deal with
Australia, and has rendered its government unable to support its increasingly urbanized
population. These same systems of environmental depletion have replicated themselves
throughout many former colonies and have created similar unequal relationships between former
colonies and their respective imperial abusers.
Another destructive quality of colonialism and its legacies is that it expands vastly over
time and geography. Because oftentimes these abuses occur very far off from the political
centers of empires, they can be neglected and ignored. The outsourcing of environmental crises
maintains the economic and social status quo in the global order. If environmental crises are
something that can be nearly entirely ignored or distanced from the decision-making core of
international organizations, then the pressure for change is unrealized. Western conservations
ethics views environmental crisis as something entirely experienced by the Global South, and
something that solely affects those outside of the “privileged center” of politics. As critical
geographer Natalie Koch demonstrates in her work in the Aral region of Kazakhstan,
environmental degradation and violence typically concern the most marginalized in society.

Schneck 66

“Calling attention to cases if environmental injustice is a strong focus in critical social science
research, but for many other actors, especially journalists and politicians, these more mundane
geographies are easily overwritten by sensational issues, such as election results or territorial
conflict.”113 The nature of slow structural violence is often unspectacular, though slow
environmental violence is nonetheless politically salient.
This conceptualization of distance allows for a sense of apathy and fatalism to prevail
regarding the creation of any sort of reparative justice. As Koch argues, “fatalism relinquishes
both the individual and governmental responsibility for finding a positive path forward,” thereby
hindering the work of justice-oriented activists. 114 Attentional biases in regards to climate
change have a significant effect on support for potential climate mitigation projects and
undertakings. The media frameworks surrounding climate change have typically excluded sociopolitical interpretations of the effects of a changing climate, and therefore have shaped our
fundamental understanding of environmentalism.115 The case of the Pacific Islands brings the
environmental and political understanding of domestic and global structural inequalities into a
clear view.

Climate Justice--A Media Approach
If, as Rob Nixon described, our society is not conducive to productive discussions on
structural violence, then why now do we see increased attention towards environmental justice?
Though the sense of apathy and fatalism prevail over international policy forums on climate
change, many Global South activists have undertaken a political and media approach—the
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approach of climate justice—that prioritizes justice for those marginalized by environmental
colonialism.
Climate justice primarily argues that the impacts of human-induced climate change are
not limited to political or environmental effects, but rather directly affect the human rights of
individuals and communities worldwide. Climate justice attests that the world’s most vulnerable
populations will be at the frontlines of climate change and that they deserve protection of their
human rights under certain human rights agreements such as the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Because these populations are often marginalized and post-colonial, the
protection that they deserve is to be drawn from the power of industrialized political powers.
This demand represents a commitment to colonial reparations as well as environmental justice.
Climate justice frameworks have largely been adopted by nations in the Global South as a
means to describe their experiences with colonialism. Much of the environmental conditions
(such as natural resource depletion, urbanization, and other socio-enviro factors) have been
heavily affected by historic colonial presence, and have also shaped the current external relations
of these nations. Climate justice also looks to “shift the burden” of climate change adaptation and
mitigation efforts by putting the responsibility onto “developed” nations that have contributed
the most heavily to climate change. In the case of the Pacific islands especially, climate justice
would naturally support the claim to colonial reparations. International climate justice is an anticolonial movement that looks to promote the interests of those directly affected by climate
change.116 This compelling mindset shaped the goals and missions of prominent Pacific activists,
especially those from the non-governmental sector.
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Climate Warriors
The Pacific Calling Partnership (PCP) was one of the first non-governmental
organizations to call attention to how global sea level rise and climate change have had specific
effects on the people of Kiribati and Tuvalu. In 2004, the PCP was created as a charity-based
organization to promote ecological and climate-based justice in Kiribati. As one of the
pioneering forces behind the fight for human rights and dignity within the ecological movement,
the PCP acted as a way to raise the voices of Pacific islanders affected by climate change and
injustices. Within their media campaign, the PCP is a vocal opponent to climate change deniers
and constantly demands climate action from both the Kiribati and Australian governments. The
PCP focuses on providing a “human face” to climate change and its effects by promoting the
stories of Pacific migrants and advocates, as well as promoting the work of climate scientists and
scholars.
For i-Kiribati and Tuvaluan people, inter-regional civil society organizations like the PCP
play an especially important role in their quest for meaningful environmental political change
given the fact that their governments have little connection to their former colonizers. This is
unlike in the case of Pacific islands in French Polynesia such as New Caledonia, which retains a
strong connection to the French government (as its residents maintain French citizenship and can
freely move throughout French territories). In contrast, organizations like the PCP are focused on
creating connections with New Zealand and Australia to establish different opportunities for their
citizens. A strong connection with these economically-powerful states would allow for a
smoother transition for potential migrants to cities with more opportunities for jobs. This is an
example of what former Kiribati president Anote Tong described as “migration with dignity.”117
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Ultimately, international connections such as these could potentially prove effective in
combating migratory crises. Leading i-Kiribati expert and advocate, Maria Tiimon talks about
how her experience at the PCP has shaped her ability to advocate for Pacific communities.
Tiimon explains that a majority of her advocacy work as the PCP is sharing her personal
experiences with climate-based migration candidly and openly with international audiences.
“You have to be comfortable sharing your story again and again.”118 The PCP prides itself on
changing the perception and opinion of international actors by amplifying the voices of Pacific
people affected by climate change. Director Jill Finnane of PCP argues that the reason so many
media sources are inclined to listen to and publish stories from Pacific islanders is that media
outlets ultimately look for real, candid, and emotional subjects for press releases and stories.
These types of testimony not only paint an accurate and truthful account of a global issue, but
also promotes an emotional story that “sells” or gains a lot of online clicks and shares. Because
there is a created emotional and financial incentive for media outlets to promote stories on the
effects of climate change, many more media outlets have been inclined to broadcast Pacific
issues, especially leading up to and during UNFCCC Committee of Parties (COP) meetings.
While the PCP is the frontrunner for climate and environmental justice in the Pacific,
many other justice-based organizations have focused their work on representing Pacific
communities and their fight against climate change. Joseph Sikulu established a chapter of the
global 350 organization for the Pacific region. Based in Fiji, Pacific 350 runs programming and
media sessions based on the demand that global leaders keep the carbon in the atmosphere below
350 parts-per-million. As a part of 350’s media campaign, Sikulu started the Pacific Climate
Warriors project that looked to engage Pacific youth in the fight against climate change. Sikulu
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championed the quip “we are not drowning, we are fighting” on social media to describe the
steps that Pacific activists are taking against climate change. From Kiribati to Nauru and The
Solomon islands, activists chant Sikulu’s mantra standing knee-deep in the ocean while wearing
traditional clothing. This campaign brilliantly produced a stark image of both the grim realities
of sea level rise, as well as the strength and dignity behind indigenous activism.
The spread of these media campaigns signifies an important change in the status of global
advocacy in the 21st Century. With the rise of modern social media, these types of advocacy
strategies can be more effective because they can reach wider audiences across different
platforms. Sikulu notably started posting relatable climate change information on the Climate
Warriors’ TikTok account accompanied with a rendition of a few of the viral dances that brought
the adolescent-oriented media platform to notoriety.119

“We are Canoes blocking Coal Ships”: Understanding Media Strategies
The widespread use of media outlets has been successful for engaging Pacific advocates
in two distinct ways. Firstly, the ability for media to bridge the large geographical divides
between islands in the Pacific has led to an increased sense of identity building and sharing
across Pacific nations. Secondly, this shared sense of identity has strengthened the Pacific island
nations’ call to climate action through cohesive media campaigns and strategies. The use of
jarring, provocative, and dramatic media strategies has effectively brought international attention
to the Pacific region, and has supported the Pacific cause.
One of the key successes of the Pacific media campaign has been creating links of
solidarity and reinforcing a shared sense of identity within the Pacific community.120 Micronesia
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and the larger area of Oceania operate rather uniquely due to the geography of the region-because the islands of Micronesia are dispersed throughout 2,000 miles of ocean, there have
historically been few opportunities and spaces for building strong networks of support. The
increased use of the internet and social media platforms has allowed for these communities to
connect and transfer ideas.
The creation of these media networks has not only helped change the world perception of
Pacific islanders and their existential fight against climate change, but it has also changed how
they view themselves. No longer are they dormant, helpless victims to a rising tide. Rather, the
increase in media connection has allowed Pacific activists to feel engaged and powerful in
having their voices heard internationally. The power of community-based advocacy has also
been transferred to Pacific leadership. Joseph Sikulu of Pacific 350 talks about the effects that
social media has had on Pacific leadership and representation. “Pacific Islanders have always
been at the frontline of climate change, and likewise their leaders have always been at the
frontlines of climate negotiations.”121
One of the driving forces behind this call to action stems from the ties with climate
inequality and global marginalization. As political geographer Natalie Koch argues, “scholars
have long shown who feels these effects and where are questions inextricably tied to larger
issues of social marginalization. And when marginal groups are subjected to environmental
contamination, this in turn reinforces their social marginalization.122 The Pacific Islands have
rallied behind the concept that they are not just small countries in the Pacific, but rather represent
the marginalized communities of the world who remain the most vulnerable to climate change.
These Pacific Island delegations have made this particularly salient in their Pacific Island Forum,
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going so far as to expel the Australian and New Zealand representatives from their working
group due to their histories as colonial powers.123 The shared experiences of environmental
marginalization have helped forged connections and shape political agendas in the Pacific
region. Within these networks, Pacific activists combined their voices into a new, innovative
campaign for international recognition and saliency. With an element of dramatics reminiscent of
day-time soap operas, the Small Pacific Island delegations have showcased their cause in eyecatching and provocative displays for international media attention.124

Spectacle: Something Unifying and Empowering
In 2009, the government of Maldives hosted an “underwater” climate conference for
international delegations. Clad in wetsuits, dive gear, and “pens and paper,” the delegates signed
their climate negotiations on a table placed 3 meters beneath the pristine waters of the Maldives
coast. As the image of fish swimming past delegates underwater drew much media attention and
iconic photo ops, the message from the government of the Maldives was clear: this is the fate of
island nations if we continue to ignore the need of a comprehensive climate agreement. During
the meeting, the delegate from Maldives held up a slate that read “SOS” to the plethora of TV
news cameras.125 "We have to get the message across by being more imaginative, more creative
and so this is what we are doing” said Maldives President Nasheed.
As theatrical as President Nasheed’s conference may be, it emphasized an important
tactic in getting the message of the Pacific islands across. Our current media epoch has been
shaped inherently by globalized connection. The importance of our consumption of images is not
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necessarily the image or content itself, it is the representations of these images that form their
value.126 The spectacle image--one that takes on its own life--is only as strong as our reception of
its narratives. A spectacle is an event that relies on “un-anticipated novelty” and “pure
singularity,” something that breaks the cycle of our typical news channels and stuffy political
discursive circles.
A testament to their spectacular nature, these media narratives dictate how political
agendas shift their focus. One of the more recent examples of such a spectacular media narrative
has been the coverage of the Runit Dome on Enewetak atoll in the Marshall Islands. The
concrete Dome--a painful living souvenir of the American nuclear legacy in the Marshalls--was
built to cap layers of highly radioactive nuclear waste on the island following the US military
tests. A November 2019 LA times piece detailing the dome’s slow collapse and subsequent
nuclear leakage have come to light, the structure has come to symbolize the environmental and
nuclear violence that the Marshallese have suffered at the hands of American forces.127 The
image of an American “nuclear time bomb” in the Pacific has taken on a life of its own and has
transmitted the call for colonial and climate justice to audiences worldwide. .
The combining of images of climate change and nuclear histories into once heartstopping, unforgettable symbol of a “nuclear timebomb” inflicts the need to act onto politicians.
In such a consumable manner, these bite-sized images can easily spread across mainstream
audiences, and churn responses from members of civil society. Following the LA Times report, a
flurry of tweets ensued demanding that more be done about combating climate change and
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creating alternatives for Pacific Islanders effectively torn from their homes due to global sea
level rise. The extent of a media spectacle’s spread is intertwined with its ability to force action
from lawmakers and diplomatic representatives; the more easily people emotionally identify with
an image or narrative, the more passionate they will be in advocating for that particular cause.
Critics of the use of spectacle argue that the use of dramatics in international media
sources is counterintuitive to the mission of Pacific advocates. In an era of “fake news,” these
media spectacles run a fine line of being considered too “dramatic” or “unscientific” to be
considered legitimate. There is also a danger of relying on these extravagant narratives: the
subjecting of spectacle to common sense erodes it into a sense of normalcy, and exhausts its
potency in media outlets.128 By evaluating something as dramatic as an underwater climate
conference in relation to conflicting scientific facts, the spectacle fails to receive adequate
respect and thus loses its mesmerizing charm. The reliance on spectacular imagery and
widespread grassroots media threatens journalistic integrity and puts us in an unhealthy situation
where a consumable media bite replaces full-course scientific analysis. Likewise, the prioritizing
of dramatics over scientific accuracy can breed mystification, orientalism, and in some cases
infantilization of actors. In the Pacific media outlets, this has resulted in many Pacific islanders
being portrayed as helpless, hopeless victims to a rising tide. The notion of “sinking islands”—
while successful in turning heads—can project an image of passivity and helplessness to the
world. Spectacular images are immensely captivating and alluring to international audiences,
however they can potentially be harmful to social movements.

Conclusion
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The cries of victims of colonial violence have historically fallen on apathetic ears. In our
own interpretations of human rights advocacy, instances of colonial damage and structural
inequalities have long been disregarded in favor of short, consumable accounts of the
“spectacular.” Though the discipline of Human Rights Studies has been around for over 70 years,
we are now only beginning to examine the relation between colonial extraction, the environment,
and human rights abuses. While the qualms of “slow violence” have historically been ignored in
international media spaces, new changes in the perception of these human rights abuses have
begun to bring new attention to these violent structures.
Thanks to the creative work of many Pacific activists, the effects and violences of climate
change are much more understandable. The crash of waves now elicits the same intrigue as the
burst of bombs or the fire of missiles. We as international audience members only have the
capacity to empathize and act on behalf of concepts we believe we understand. By reimagining
climate change and colonial violence into media spectacles, Pacific activists flipped Rob Nixon’s
interpretation of slow violence. Effectively, these Pacific agents countered the typical apathetic
response reserved for victims of slow, environmental violence by making their oppression
consumable and emotional. By translating their situation into unforgettable media bites, these
advocates could better harness the potential energy of civil society and mainstream audiences in
demanding diplomatic actions from country representatives.
However, there is a second step for how these spectacles make physical change in
international negotiation spaces. While spectacles are inherently eye-catching and emotional,
they must be successfully transformed into policy by diplomats. This “translation” of media hype
into diplomatic agendas is key to understanding exactly how certain narratives can shape the
outcome of large conventions such as the Paris Accords. In the case of Pacific climate
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diplomacy, these spectacular narratives were crucial in making heads turn in the United Nations.
These emotional media spectacles effectively made for emotional diplomatic performances that
brought about unprecedented change in the UNFCCC meetings. By rejecting the norms of
formal, professional debate, these emotional performers were received in a uniquely open way,
and had lasting effects on the outcome of these climate change conferences. In the next chapter, I
will explore exactly why emotions are so transformative in typical debate, and how--through
institutional change--these emotional performances came to be.
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Chapter 3: Breaking Diplomacy

“Madam President, this is not an ego trip.”

A man clad in a pale-blue dress shirt with a flower wreath draped over his
shoulders huddles meekly over the microphone attached to his desk. Peering over
his wide-rimmed glasses, he makes eye contact with the sitting president of the
Copenhagen COP 19 meeting, Connie Hedegaard, as he continues to speak. “We
have had our proposal on the table for 6 months--it is ironic that the fate of the
world lies in the hands of the United States congress.” After brazenly criticizing
President Obama’s reception of the Nobel Peace Prize, he dives into his
frustration with the lack of progress made throughout the Committee of Parties
climate meeting.

“The fate of my country rests in your hands.” The voice of Ian Fry, the Tuvalan
delegate at COP 19, began to crack. “We are not Naive.” His neighbors
uncomfortably shifted in their seats as his streaming tears became more visible. “I
woke up this morning and I was crying, and that is not an easy thing for a grown
man to admit.”129
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The dramatics of Ian Fry’s performance made news headlines worldwide. Reporters and
journalists were stunned at the unprecedented display of emotion in the UNFCCC negotiation
table. Some reporters ran with the prospect of a catchy headline, claiming witness to an
emotional battlefield, or a “diplomatic screaming match” at the COP meeting. While headlines
ranged in the severity of the interaction, reporters could not get enough of Fry’s performance. A
professional male to openly show vulnerability and emotion at such an incredibly important
debate was such a shock to the international community. Despite differing reports of the events
at the COP, the increased media attention proved helpful for raising the Pacific island
environmental agenda.
The “success” of Pacific island media narratives was forged into the Paris Accords by a
coalition of institutional amendments and alternative diplomatic strategies that challenged
traditional norms of debate. The definitive agent of change in the UNFCCC was the Pacific
delegation’s strategic wielding of powerful emotional testimony. As we examine the writings of
Carol Farbotko and Dominique Moïsi, we begin to understand that emotions hold a particularly
poignant and eruptive nature that demand movement in debate. Emotions challenge the very
nature of Western debate--their raw and uncomfortable implementation overhaul typical
procedures and deeply affect their audience.
To many researchers, the question of the diplomatic success of the Pacific island states
forms a sort-of “structuralist paradox” in the UNFCCC, where countries with lower GDPs and
regional significance--that is, the structurally weak countries--collectively made significant
strides to create an entire diplomatic body to advocate for their interests. However, this paradox
can be explained through a powerful collective injection of emotional performances into
UNFCCC meetings. In order to bring about this unprecedented change, the Pacific delegates
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significantly re-structured climate-change negotiations in a way that better served them and their
positions. By stripping the UN debate platform of its typical unfair, power-based structure, and
integrating civil society voices directly into negotiations, these Pacific advocates set the stage for
their effective, tear-jerking drama. This structural remodeling made it possible for skilled
diplomats to inject emotional performances that “broke” norms of debate.
This chapter will examine how spectacular images have been translated and used in UN
negotiations to bring about meaningful action. In this regard, I will demonstrate the particularly
powerful role emotions play in diplomacy, and how emotional performances have the capacity to
shift debates in favor of those at a structural disadvantage. Diplomatic performances are not
simply a one-sided attempt to push legislation forward, but rather are multifaceted displays that
shape national perceptions, identities, and values in international spaces. This analysis will begin
with a brief background into some key structural shifts that allowed for the integration of
emotional testimony into climate negotiations--namely the inception of the UNFCCC itself and
its later integration of civil society actors and organizations. These key events helped create a
more equitable platform that allowed for the emotional and spectacular performances to have a
significantly strong effect on the outcome of debate. This action is demonstrated in the adoption
of “climate justice” and Pacific-related language in the Paris Accords. These spectacular media
events would be nothing if it were not for the highly-strategic, skilled, pragmatic and coalition of
diplomatic performances in the UN. While the spectacular media imagination of climate change
has made climate justice a politically salient issue, the emotional diplomatic performances of
Pacific coalitions put Pacific agendas into motion within discursive spaces.
The diplomatic upheaval of climate change negotiations took part in a few distinct ways.
Firstly, the creation of the UNFCCC as a more equitable debate platform--given its 1 country-1

Schneck 80

vote structure and periodic revision clauses--made way for smaller nations to have a greater say
in convention drafting.130 This structural change also allowed the incorporation of NGOs and
media organizations directly into the diplomatic process within the 2009 Committee of Parties
meeting in Copenhagen. This blurring of barriers between state and non-state diplomatic actors
facilitated a coalition-building between Pacific activists, and helped consolidate the Pacific
performance during the COP. Most importantly, the use of Pacific actors’ dramatic, emotional
testimony in the UNFCCC “broke” the norms of formal, emotionless debate in such a way that it
forced delegates to act and adopt justice-oriented language into the climate accords.131 By
overhauling the traditional norms of UN debate, Pacific island climate activists demanded action
in a way that could not be ignored or overlooked as slow violence movements have historically.

Setting the Stage: Background on the Creation of the UNFCCC
In order to set the stage for their emotional diplomatic debut, AOSIS (Alliance of Small
Island States) working group members came together to reimagine how climate change
negotiations could proceed. Up until the 1990s, most climate discussions took place sporadically
within the UN General Assembly (UNGA) framework.132 There did not exist any sort of
continuity within these environmental meetings, which meant that attempts to create any
substantive climate doctrine were often derailed. At one of these early UNGA meetings--the
1992 Earth Summit--Pacific leaders congregated together to attempt to create a formal, separate
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body to be solely dedicated to negotiating carbon emissions.133 Even in the early 1990s, it was
apparent that climate change and rising sea levels posed a disproportionate existential threat to
these low-lying nations, and this mindset drove these Pacific leaders to advocate for a new
negotiation body.134
The United Nations Framework on the Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, was
created in 1992 as the main negotiation body for climate change agreements.135 It is the UN body
known for drafting the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Accords, which remain the current
working agreements for global carbon emissions. The goal of the UNFCCC is to create a
working document to hold nations accountable for lowering carbon emissions relative to their
economic production and foster a space in which both “developed” and “developing” nations
have stake in these negotiations. Member countries introduced the concept of Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) at the 2007 COP-13 meeting in Bali, citing the need
to make adjustments for developing economies.136 This mentality is indicative of developing
nations’ commitment to climate justice, as climate justice understands that the burden of climate
adaptation must fall primarily on developed countries, as they are the most culpable for climate
change and its effects. By acknowledging the disproportionate impact that developed economies
have on climate change, the UNFCCC members paved the way for a more nuanced
understanding of a just climate doctrine.
While molding the UNFCCC, the Pacific island delegates were mindful not to simply
mimic the power-structure of the main UN body. Rather, these delegates aimed to reimagine a
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more equitable forum that better accounted for the voices of traditionally marginalized groups.
The most significant aspect of the UNFCCC’s debate structure is its unique 1-vote, 1-country
policy.137 Typically in the United Nations General Assembly, votes are dominated by the
Permanent 5 (P5) that hold coveted “veto-power” over any debate or piece of legislation.138
Given the power of these P5 member states--the UK, US, France, China, and Russia--oftentimes
negotiations would often fall stagnant to the whims of these delegations given the divisive nature
of climate negotiations. AOSIS member states knew that if climate negotiation were left to the
United Nations Security Council or General Assembly forums, they would be too easily
manipulated by the veto powers of P5 members and become subsequently gridlocked.139
Given the particular history of Pacific nations like the Marshall Islands and their deprival
of autonomy over land, this improvement is historically significant and salient. The equitable
structure of the UNFCCC inhibits the recreation of the colonial power dynamics that were
reinforced under the UNGA and UNSC framework. For the first time in the modern world order,
former colonies can have the same negotiation power over their natural environment as their
former colonizers. Likewise, by integrating more non-governmental voices into the UNFCCC,
these actors advocated for a more decentralized, multilateral debate forum.140
The next important structural change came in 2009, when the president of the COP-15
meeting in Copenhagen flipped climate change diplomacy on its head by allowing nongovernmental, civil society organizations to attend and partake in the negotiations.141 The
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integration of NGOs into the UNFCCC was the most impactful change to the forum to date. The
direct engagement with civil society helped forge coalitions between Pacific diplomats and
activists from climate justice organizations. The rise of global non-governmental advocacy
groups is contingent not only on the rise of media and community forming, but also on a change
in the formalities of these accords. 142
Under this new framework, NGOs need the support of government delegations in order to
make direct comments within discussions and may seem as junior partners in climate forums.143
However, many of these NGOs operate in a symbiotic relationship with a supporting government
delegation--oftentimes in exchange for press coverage or media headlines, diplomats will bring
up certain goals and agendas that organization members want addressed in discussions.
Likewise, these NGOs have been extremely helpful in directing attention towards the work of
specific diplomats and painting their work in a particularly flattering light. The significance of
this coalition building lies within the increased media attention focused on diplomatic
performances, and an increased connection with members of civil society. As government
delegations search for potential speakers and invitees to speak in front of committee meetings,
they often find themselves relying on these NGO networks to find particularly powerful and
talented orators. 144
The Pacific delegations at COP-15 in Copenhagen welcomed certain groundbreaking
climate justice-oriented groups to sit in on many of these negotiations. While these organizations
were not approached to partake in the actual negotiations themselves, their presence was
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impactful in drawing media attention to key actors and issues. The Pacific Calling Partnership-or PCP--is a climate justice-based organization that focuses on promoting the voices of Pacific
Islanders primarily from Kiribati and Tuvalu.145 As these COP meetings continued to change and
evolve, Pacific leaders have repeatedly used their connection with civil society to strengthen
their emotional testimony and pleas for climate action.146 The coalitions formed within this
integration of NGO voices have facilitated the powerful emotional performances that have in
turn demanded the attention and action of international negotiators.

Emotion, Performance, and Power
Performance in international spaces has multiple key functions. Diplomacy is revered to
be a social “art” that representatives spend years, or even decades, to refine. Diplomats have the
obligation to act as the facilitators of state power and the enactors of state identities. Diplomatic
performance, therefore, has the full capacity to shape, aid, or diminish their representative state’s
power in global politics.147 As Farbotko argues, UN performances “charge individuals with
immense responsibility for the (de)legitimizing of state claims and, simultaneously, enhances or
impairs their own reputations.”148 Delegates have the pressure to advocate not only for their
country’s diplomatic agendas, but also to establish the reputation of their home nations through
their performances. The performance of diplomats in international spaces is inherently tied into
projections of state power.
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The pressure to perform is undoubtedly more concentrated on smaller, non-Western
states. The UN debate stage functions as a Western institution that puts an undue burden on nonWestern states to submit themselves to Western standards. Not only is there extra energy exerted
for these nations to “pretend” to become more Western and acceptable, there is also a certain
trauma and loss of identity that is also inflicted upon these delegations. There remains a powerful
pressure to exhibit signs of strength and rationality within diplomatic settings, and demonstration
of emotion is frowned upon. While state relations may be driven by emotion below the surface,
diplomatic performances are expected to be emotionless, objective, and formal. In the case of the
Pacific Islands, especially given their history as a traditionally underrepresented region in the
UN, the governments’ delegates have significant power and responsibility to shape the external
relations and perceptions of their home states.149
Furthermore, as Alun Jones discusses in Performance, Emotions, and Diplomacy,
diplomatic performance shapes identity through a moral invocation to act. It establishes motive,
agendas, and actions to an international audience. It is as much of a translation of culture and
heritage as it is a representation of state functions. For diplomats, representing the state is an
active “lived experience that exposes the challenges and vulnerabilities of personal performance
through everyday political geographies.”150 As such, while we typically understand diplomatic
performances as inherently separate from displays of vulnerability and emotion, if states act as
emotive, moralizing forces in debate, they can identify their delegation as the “moral” leaders in
international negotiations. This role of “moral leadership” has often been attributed to the Pacific
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given their outspokenness surrounding climate change. The moral guidance forged through these
state performances determines the identity of these delegations and inspires others to act.
As we begin to understand the power of emotion in diplomatic performances, we can
better account for their power in diplomatic spaces. The study of “emotional geopolitics” looks
to provide a more nuanced interpretation of the effect that emotion has on global politics and
state relations. Emotional geopolitics was born to counter the interpretation that the most
effective way for diplomats to have their agendas heard and respected is by being formal and
emotionless. This emerging field of study looks to distance the understanding of global
diplomacy as an inherently stoic, masculine space. By deconstructing formalities of debate and
making it more accessible for human testimony and translation, these thinkers attempt to create a
more egalitarian and just negotiation process.151152
This nuanced understanding of global diplomacy has begun to inform scholarship on the
power of performance. “In an age of globalization,” International Relation theorist Dominique
Moïsi argues, “emotions have become indispensable to grasp the complexity of the world we live
in. Magnified by media focus, they both reflect and react to globalization and in turn influence
geopolitics.”153 Moïsi shows how modern geopolitics is characterized by a newfound “clash of
emotions” that drives political interactions between states. Emotions, he argues, do much more
than simply catch attention on debate stages. Rather, emotions define the very essence of state
identities and interactions. In the age of globalization, when everything and everybody are
continuously connected, it is important to assert one's individuality; to make a memorable
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performance is to demand respect and establish notoriety among peers. Emotive performances by
state delegations tell global audiences: “I am unique, I am different, and, if necessary, I am
willing to fight until you recognize my existence.”154 Emotions ultimately define states in
relation to their respective position in global geopolitics.
The fight for recognition is a dynamic one. Scholar Carol Farbotko’s theory of emotional
performance can explain how spontaneous emotional performances are so well received in the
UN. Beyond their capabilities in making heads turn in the United Nations, emotions are powerful
and syncratic enough to force change in negations. Farbotko argues, “Possibilities for change
arise when emotions enter the climate change decision making process, even though these areas
are spaces that privilege rational exchange.”155 Emotions in diplomacy are often unexpectedly
powerful. Emotions affect everything in their path; oftentimes they are not contained within a
particular context or audience, but disperse through the retellings and sharing of stories.
Emotions make subjects personal and irrevocable--their real significance is that they
affect audiences deeply and permanently. One of the unique qualities of emotions is that they are
not confined to the spaces in which they occur, but rather expand and affect changing audiences.
Emotions and spectacles live long past their initial context. Twenty years from now, little will be
remembered on how elegant, rational, and poised diplomats spoke on the prospect of climate
change action. Hardly anyone will discuss the commonplace pleasantries and professional
demeanor. However, the feelings evoked from witnessing an underwater conference or grown
men weeping on the debate floor can never be taken away. Those feelings and memories will
forever be connected with the painful realities of a changing climate and shaped perspectives of
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global leaders. These emotional moments irreversibly alter the memories and discourses of
climate change in a way that propels these agendas forward.

In the following subsections, I will illustrate the above theoretical points by first
examining the historical underpinnings of the norm of emotionless debate and how it has come
to shape international diplomacy. Then, I will describe how the injection of emotion into the
Pacific delegation’s diplomatic performances effectively “broke” these norms and threw off the
traditional course of climate discussions. This rupture of “typical” debate procedure is the most
powerful element of the Pacific’s quest to get their climate justice agenda recognized and
realized into meaningful diplomatic action within the UNFCCC.

Traditions of Emotionless Debate--Unequal Burdens of Western Hegemony
Political theorists Kay Anderson and Susan Smith advance the argument that the logics of
rationality and efficiency depend on the silencing of emotions. “Emotional relations tend to be
regarded as something apart […] as something that is essentially private, and does not
substantially infuse the public/policy sphere.”156According to proponents of rational exchange,
diplomatic norms are supposedly sacred. Debate stages are understood to be emotionless, frigid
spaces. The United Nations is an international negotiation body predicated on informed, rational,
and hence masculine discourse rather than feminine emotional dramatics. Its actors are expected
to uphold certain professional customs when presenting in public debate.
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Under the theory of rational exchange, diplomats are expected to uphold a separation
between personal needs and requirements and those of the state.157 As diplomats present
themselves before onlookers, their primary duty is to adequately represent the state and perform
its functions; all personal needs and desires are secondary. Emotions, on the other hand, are
inherently personal. By maintaining a separation between the personal and professional in
diplomacy, rational theorists argue not only for a suppression of emotions and vulnerability, but
also the characteristic needs of one's self. Arguably, this adherence to emotionless rationalism
has shaped the slow, professional nature of international diplomacy and has defined what we
consider typical state behavior.
One key area of diplomacy that often utilizes this masculine, professional aura is the field
of international trade negotiations. Trade negotiations are seen as a projection of a state’s
professionalism and economic capacity--they oftentimes shape the future of economic relations
between states. In such settings, small Pacific island states have demonstrated the full capacity to
utilize traditional norms of “professional” diplomatic discourse to advance their interests.158 For
example, a new economic project of countries like Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands include
increasing economic relations with Indonesia and especially China.159 Increasing trade with
China signifies much more than an economic boost to Pacific economies. Rather, closer relations
with China indicate a growing presence of Chinese influence in the region, as well as a defiance
against the economic history that many Pacific states have held with the United States.
Supporting China sends a clear message that these Pacific Islands are welcoming China’s
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increasing strategic influence in the region, while also demonstrating its autonomy from the
West. Throughout the trade negotiation process, Vanuatu maintained a professional, rational
demeanor with China, and in return fostered a relationship that helped boost its economic
legitimacy in the region.160 Pacific activists knew exactly when rational debate or emotional
performances were most effective, and can change their behavior accordingly.

Emotional Debate -- Weeping Diplomats
If the UN forum is predicated on rational, emotionless debate, then how seriously can we
take weeping diplomats? As we examined with Ian Fry’s tearful performance in Copenhagen,
delegates do not always act in a “rational” manner. While the norms of UN negotiations
prioritize rational discourse, these emotional displays countered our traditional understandings of
masculine professionalism. They broke what we believed to be the “correct” way of performing
diplomacy.
If the absence of emotion is considered “rational” and professional, then the presence of
emotions is inherently irrational. As Moïsi argues, irrational behavior of states is what propels
change and action forward in international relations. The Pacific performance of irrational,
emotional testimony on the UNFCCC stage is the fundamental reason why these diplomats were
unexpectedly successful in advancing their climate justice agendas internationally. Ultimately,
the norms of the United Nations and its debate structure uphold Western power dynamics and
benefit states who have a disproportionate amount of geopolitical power. Therefore, in order for
marginalized nations to have a significant effect on diplomacy, they have to do something that
rejects these norms.
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Kathy Jetnil-Kilijiner--a young Marshallese activist and political poet--was chosen to
represent civil society in the 2014 meetings leading up to the landmark Paris Accords. This
choice was enacted as a result of a coalition between the Pacific state delegations and their NGO
networks. Kathy performed “Dear Matafele Peinem” dedicated to her infant daughter and the
uncertain future she faces growing up in the Marshall Islands:

“Dear Matafele Peinam,
I want to tell you about that lagoon
that lucid, sleepy lagoon lounging against the sunrise
men say that one day
that lagoon will devour you
they say it will gnaw at the shoreline
chew at the roots of your breadfruit trees
gulp down rows of your seawalls
and crunch your island’s shattered bones.” (Kilijner, 2014)

Kilijiner did not shy away from exposing her deeply personal fears and thoughts; she
unabashedly invoked her experience and desires as a mother to bring her child into a safe and
bright future. Kilijiner goes on to describe how her daughter and countrymates are projected to
wander stateless “with only a passport to call home” due to the inaction of global leaders.161
Instead of ending on a pessimistic or sour note, Kiljiner’s beautiful poem ends with a call to
action. She assures her infant daughter that the world leaders that sit before her in committee will
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take meaningful action and commit to climate reform. She attests that world leaders will make
the change to save not only their lives, but also their livelihoods.
Kiljiner’s performance in the UNFCCC left delegates stunned in their seats. Her beautiful
prose and emotional inflection brought the debate to a near-complete standstill. Delegates, media
outlets, and audience members alike praised her touching performance; even the official
UNFCCC twitter page attested that there was not a dry eye in the room.162 Media analysts
covering Kilijner’s performance claimed that she evoked a sense of solastalgia, or “the
increasingly pervasive feeling of sadness and loss for a world that’s being irreversibly
altered.”163 This somber, mournful feeling is considered extremely powerful and pervasive in
climate discussions and has been attributed to effective political mobilization.164 The real power
behind these Pacific performances is their ability to inflict such forceful emotional responses,
and infect diplomats on both a personal and professional level.
One of the most captivating and poignant expressions of Pacific activism in the UN is its
co-optation of traditionally feminine traits and emotional displays. Though many Pacific media
spectacles have focused on culturally masculine roles like “warriors” or “voyagers,” their
representation in the UN has been led by women or through traditionally “feminine”
performances. While the image of “voyagers” has been used to represent the Pacific’s historical
sovereign claim to the land, the feminine portrayal of Pacific activists has come to present a
universal, moral movement towards climate justice. In addition to Ian Fry’s tearful testimony and
Kathy Jetñil-Kiljiner’s mournful testimony, many other effective diplomatic performances have
been led by women. Milañ Loeak, the daughter of former Marshallese president Chris Loeak, has
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also led impactful calls to action in international debate. In 2014, Loeak led other members of the
Pacific Climate Warriors in urging states to “join [them] in the fight to keep my home above
water.”165
The performance of traditionally “feminine” emotions does not come as an affront to
diplomatic integrity. The procurement of emotions is an equally valid and effective mode of state
representation as any stoic or masculine diplomatic performance. The emotional Pacific
testimonies have come to counter the overpowering hegemony of hyper-masculine state
performances. By rejecting the oppressive norms of typical debate, these Pacific activists caught
the attention of international onlookers and incited delegations to act in support of their climate
justice agendas. By poetically performing their indigeneity on an international stage, Pacific
activists assumed the position of moral leaders and role models of the climate change discussion,
and inspired (or alternatively, guilted) more powerful states to act.166

Conclusion
The invocation of raw emotion is a deliberate, conscious, and genuine strategy of Pacific
diplomats. The spectacular, eye-catching images discussed in the previous chapter can only bring
about meaningful change if they are successfully translated into diplomatic spaces through
emotional performances. Diplomacy is an attachment between the personal, the political, and the
aesthetic. While structural and diplomatic change in the UNFCCC led to a more equal playing
field for states, ultimately the integration of emotional testimony was so shocking and
unprecedented that it compelled powerful nations to act.
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The coalition building between sectors of Pacific climate activism has created, in the
words of Carol Farbotko, a new perceived notion of “insurgent cosmopolitanism” in the
Pacific.167 Through these forged channels of connection, activists from different disciplines have
coalesced together to overhaul the traditional inner workings of the UN. This primarily comes in
the form of a post-Copenhagen multilateral debate forum developed by both governmental and
non-governmental actors. Increased NGO involvement is neither in competition with state
dominance nor necessarily signals the erosion of state diplomacy. Rather, the integration of nonstate advocates in diplomacy creates a more nuanced, accessible debate stage. To many
diplomatic scholars, Copenhagen represents a significant change in the future of international
climate negotiations. This future is one that is inclusive of the voices of civil society and
members of a modern epoch of advocacy.168 While the integration of civil society signifies a new
era of diplomacy, it does not indicate an erosion of the diplomatic power of state representatives.
Rather, this integration has increased the connections between NGOs and government officials,
which has in turn widened the possibility for emotional performances like those of Kathy JetñilKilijner and Ian Fry.
Not only has emotion changed the way we interpret diplomacy, it has also forced us to
reimagine environmental violence and climate change in a geo-spacial context. The visualization
of the Global South as inherently more vulnerable to climate change reinforces the narrative that
climate justice advocates want to advance. By forcing such images as that of the “sinking island”
into international debate spaces, climate advocates call attention to the imperative need for
climate action and justice. As Moïsi discusses, a global “clash of emotions” is unfolding in these
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climate debates, where the institutional stoic and polluting Global North is pitted against the
emotional nurture of the Global South. With performances as poignant and moving as Kathy’s,
this emotional cleavage is further representation of the unequal, unjust dynamics of global
climate change and its traditionally apathetic response.
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Conclusion

In January 2020, the United Nations voted to recognize “climate refugees” and prohibit
the refoulement of any individuals displaced due to climate change. The United Nations Human
Rights Commission ruled that countries have the obligation to protect climate migrants under
their commitment to the UN Human Rights Charter. The ruling elaborates: “Given the risk of an
entire country becoming submerged under water is such an extreme risk, the conditions of life in
such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with dignity before the risk is
realized.”169 Of all possible images of climate-induced displacement, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission incorporated into its ruling the “sinking island” metaphor. Though we know
these images are a dramatization of the actual conditions faced by islanders, they represent the
successful translation of slow, environmental violence into unforgettable and spectacular global
images. This Climate Refugee ruling is set to challenge the fundamental flaws in our
international legal system, and provide a sense of justice to those directly affected by climate
change. None of this would be possible if not for the effective rhetorical and diplomatic media
strategies of the Pacific climate justice advocates.
In many ways, this ruling is the continuation of the commitment to “a climate change
displacement facility” as was outlined in the 2015 Paris Accords. Pacific islanders are no longer
constrained by the framework of “imperial migrancy” and can now claim their status as refugees
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with access to rights and benefits for any individual that is forced to move. Better yet, the
demand of mitigation and adaptation strategies coupled with opening opportunities for migration
means that these Pacific island nations have more agency in responding to climate change. The
adoption of the climate refugee ruling is indicative of a change in international migration
dynamics. This ruling is testament to the tireless diplomatic campaign of Pacific advocates in
getting their voices heard in the UN.
The rise of Pacific Island climate advocacy is testament to the history of environmental
and social oppression and exploitation suffered by communities across the Global South. In
many ways, the environmental dangers faced by the Pacific Island states emulate the imperial
violence they faced historically at the hands of these same polluting nations. Climate change is
very much a product of colonialism. Its disproportionate effects and harm towards developing
countries is indicative of global interstate inequality and the lasting effects of imperial control.
As we see in the case of the US nuclear project in the Marshall Islands, the environmental
sovereignty of many of these developing nations is not something that has been fully realized in
our modern world order. Our analysis on the success of these Pacific leaders must be rooted in an
understanding of the adverse preconditions that they face as former colonies--historic injustices
that had become engrained into the structure of the United Nations and limit the agency of
former colonies in UN forums.
One of the key powers of the Pacific activists is their revamping of the historicallyignored “slow environmental violence” into something modern, relevant, digestible, and--above
all--memorable. Unlike Rob Nixon’s claim that our media preference for sudden, “spectacular”
human rights abuses detracts from our understanding of historic colonial violence, these
spectacular narratives have actually helped push Pacific environmental agendas forward in media
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spaces. The power of spectacles is undeniable in their full capacity--with images of sinking
islands, nuclear time bombs, and canoe-bound asylum seekers, these Pacific activists have
captivated audiences worldwide. To create an image so raw and captivating that it takes on a life
outside its original context is to reinvent how we envision an issue as expansive and profound as
climate change. Beyond invoking a flurry of shares from viewers in their living rooms, these
iconic spectacles also inflict a call to action on world leaders. The advancement of media
attention regarding climate change had a definitive effect on shaping diplomatic goals in the
UNFCCC. Collective international attention molds political agendas.
These Pacific Island advocates countered the unequal structural problems they faced by
creating the UNFCCC to negotiate a climate change legislation. The unprecedented one-country,
one-vote structure stripped away the structural inequalities that reinforced imperial power
dynamics in the United Nations. By using the structure of the UNFCCC to their full advantage,
Pacific island states utilized numerous working groups to help solidify their identity as postcolonial states and raise their voices and concerns in a group setting. The coalition-building
between state and non-state representatives that occurred as the result of this integration also
paved the way for heartfelt speakers like Kathy Jetñil-Kilijner and Ian Fry to shake up debate
procedures with their tear-jerking performances.
In order to strategically advance their ideas, NGOs need to synchronize their respective
interests with those of governments in a way that maintains focus on the overarching goals of
mitigation and adaptation. Moreover, more than symbolizing a readiness to participate, the
diplomatic integration of civil society represents an emerging expectation of NGOs to do so. No
longer will civil society wait for governments to solve global problems. In this new century our
global society expects to participate in problem-solving. These changes in the Paris Agreement
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ultimately exemplify a form of “hybrid multilateralism” that incorporates the actions of both
state and non-state actors.170 Increased NGO involvement is neither in competition with state
dominance nor necessarily signals the erosion of state diplomacy. Rather, the integration of nonstate advocates in diplomacy creates a more nuanced, accessible debate forum.171
The Pacific Islands represent a case of exception. With exceptional story tellers,
diplomats, and media strategists, these activists made their experience with environmental
violence captivating and politically salient. The success of Pacific activists comes as an affront to
our current human rights regime. Given our understanding of the historical foundations of the
United Nations as an institutional continuation of imperial powers, we know that the structure of
international relations is biased. It does not make adequate space for smaller, formerly-colonized
nations to voice their concerns and make discursive change, and does not address underlying
structural and political inequalities among states. The United Nations has always been a
mechanism for powerful countries to determine what is important in relation to their own
interests. We live in a world where global agendas are set by a few powerful nations who too
often disregard the real impacts that their actions have on developing nations globally.
In many ways, we can look at the success of Pacific climate justice activists as an
example of a wider analysis of resistance against imperial structural legacies. Sidney Tarrow
argues that a social movement is inherently shaped by the existence of political opportunity
structures. According to Tarrow, social movements arise “when shifting political conditions open
opportunities for disruption and the activities of social movements in turn can alter political
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policies and structures.”172 While Tarrow ascribed his theory primarily to domestic movements,
we can still understand its implications in a global context. Though officially predicated on an
organized anarchy, the structure of the UN and international debate reinforce a system of
hierarchy reminiscent of domestic state mechanisms. Structural changes to UN bodies can
facilitate the same political opportunities as one in a domestic context. In the Pacific example,
the shifting political conditions within climate diplomacy can be attributed to the Pacific Islands’
commitment to creating a more egalitarian structure within the UNFCCC. The shift in the
structural composition of international diplomacy gave way for the grassroots climate justice
movement to flourish and succeed in the way that it did. The success of the Pacific island media
hustle was contingent on the structural integration of NGOs into UN debate. The case of Pacific
climate advocacy thus supports Tarrow’s theory that social movement and momentum are related
to key institutional and structural changes, and provides insight into international applications of
his theory. A look into the Pacific diplomatic success can give us a better understanding of how
underdogs can reject the institutional structures that hold them in place.
However, while Tarrow’s framework helps us to understand how the structural changes
to the UNFCCC brought about the possibility for successful climate diplomacy, it does not fully
describe the influential role that these climate activists had in pushing their agendas forward.
Structural change may have created a political opportunity for Pacific activists, but ultimately the
organization and strategic actions of these movements translated this opportunity into tangible
change. The force that propels social movements forward is not the structural change itself, but
rather the coalition of activists behind a movement. The success of social movements lies
primarily within the identity of its participants--the real catalyst for change comes from their
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strategic and symbolic representation of their social cause. As Doug McAdams and his
collaborators write, “mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared
meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation.”173
The strength, resilience, creativity and cultural resurgence that we see in the case of
Pacific climate activism is in many ways a testament to the power of indigenous climate action.
In terms of representation in issues concerning indigenous groups, scholars like Carol Farbotko
have noted the affixed hyper-marginalization of indigenous groups in international climate
change negotiations. As traditionally marginalized in colonial and international spheres,
indigenous groups have been ignored in international negotiations, even though they are often
the most affected by climate change. To Farbotko, successful indigenous climate action serves as
a uniting force for the advancement of indigenous environmental rights worldwide.174 In many
ways, the Pacific Islands’ path to political saliency paved the way for other similar solidarity
movements to advocate for climate justice in these international forums. As we see similar
indigenous movements push for environmental and climate justice, we can understand how the
success of one group advances the collective vocation of them all.
In our modern era of increased visibility and media connections, many of these activists
have presented themselves on the basis of their indigenous identity. In the case of Bolivia,
climate justice activists have promoted a vision of Andean indigeneity to support their anticapitalist environmental claims.”175 The presenting of indigenous identity has unified what
Farbotko calls the “fourth world” around the “disproportionate experience of adverse climate
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change impacts.”176 Indigeneity has represented a strong, empowering, and unifying force that
bonds movements across cultural contexts. While indigeneity connotes a strong and resilient
image in relation to social movements, it has also been attributed as an inherently vulnerable
identity in both domestic and international spheres.
Political sociologist Emma Mitchell discusses how the imagination of vulnerability plays
into social movements. “The concept of vulnerability has become a prominent way of framing
disadvantage both within and beyond the academy. Expressions like ‘the most vulnerable’
appear in public discourse to refer to specific social groups who are particularly susceptible to
multiple and overlapping adversities.”177 Identifying and portraying oneself as a vulnerable actor
in social movements can help advance the movement based on shared characteristics with other
progressive campaigns. As we have seen in the case of the Pacific Islands, the notion of
“vulnerability” plays a unique and contradictory role in shaping international perceptions of the
movement. While the vulnerable perception of the “sinking islands” makes significant headway
in international media outlets, it potentially detracts from Pacific agency and commitment to
reparational climate justice. While it is difficult to determine whether this framework is entirely
net-positive in the climate movement, it is impossible to deny that the appearance of
vulnerability has had a significant effect on the portrayal of Pacific climate activism and their
diplomatic success.
The spectacular activism from the Pacific Islands has undoubtedly given us a glimpse
into the power of social movements and alternative environmental activism. Avenues of future
research would include looking for the future development of the annual COP Climate debates
and the inevitable changes that will accompany the progression of the Paris Accords
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negotiations. Given the pressing nature of climate change adaptation, these negotiations will
have to evolve at increasingly desperate speeds. Climate migrants will continue to move and
emerge from an increasingly wide range of places. Soon, our conceptualization of climate
refugees will no longer be confined to Pacific islanders fleeing tides in canoes or families
crossing the Sahara and Mediterranean, but rather will encompass both urban and rural peoples
worldwide. As the effects of climate change become a lived reality for more and more people
across the globe, we will understand the significance of the Pacific’s commitment to climate
justice.
The goal of this thesis has been to demonstrate that international human rights has never
truly existed within its utopic, philanthropic ideal. From human rights’ formal inception within
the 1947 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we have always had institutional lapses in
protection for the victims of structural and environmental violence. As the United Nations itself
was founded as an extension of imperial power, its human rights regime was not created in a
truly humanitarian manner. We must rethink our decision of putting the bulk of international
human rights protections in an institution predicated on the advancement of Western power
structures and empires. We need an uprooting of typical diplomatic norms in order to advance
justice-oriented frameworks especially in regards to smaller, “developing,” post-colonial states.
While the Pacific islands have demonstrated their exceptional achievement in getting their
climate agendas slowly realized, complete climate justice is only possible and effective if it
progresses in a way that is remarkable and alternative to our typical understanding of
international negotiation.
As we enter an era where it is no longer possible to deny the links between global
inequalities and climate change, we must reimagine a more revolutionary approach to human
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rights protection. Only through a dismantling of the oppressive structural dynamics of the United
Nations can we even begin to bring about a meaningful and restorative climate justice. Along
with stripping away the inherent institutional inequalities of the United Nations and its debate
procedure, we must also deconstruct our own preconceptions of potential and legitimate
diplomatic actors. We must view the “victims” of climate change not as helpless modern-day
martyrs, but rather as capable agents of change who can adequately contribute to their own
political and physical survival. Not drowning in the apathy of imperial institutions founded in
their own marginalization, these activists are fighting for restorative climate justice and are
continuously showing the world that they can in fact swim.
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